Chinese | About Us | Navigation
  • Editor’s Foreword Whither Rural China: Capitalism, Socialism, Or?( 编者前言: 中国农村往哪里去?资本主义、社会主义、还是?)

    Philip C. C. Huang 2014/11/25
  • Is “Family Farms” the Way to Develop Chinese Agriculture?

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
    Early in 2013 China’s Party Central sounded the call for developing so-called “family farms.” A great deal of discussion ensued, in which the dominant view has been to call for developing scale economies in “family farming” through greatly increased transfers of land, in the belief that largescale farms would help raise both labor and land productivity. The slogan used, “family farms,” is borrowed from American rhetoric and reflects the way American agriculture is mistakenly imagined by many people. This article demonstrates that such a vision runs counter to the logic shown by the history of agricultural modernization throughout the world. It mistakenly tries to force China’s reality of “lots of people and little land” into an American model predicated on its opposite of “lots of land and few people,” and it mistakenly tries to apply economic concepts based on the industrial machine age to agriculture. The vision/policy is also based on a misunderstanding of the realities of contemporary American agriculture, which has long since come to be dominated by agribusiness. The determinative logic in American agricultural modernization has been to economize on labor, in contrast to the path of modernizing development that has already taken hold in practice in Chinese agriculture of the past 30 years, in which the dominant logic has been to save on land, not labor, in what I term “labor and capital dual intensifying” “small and fine” agriculture. The American “big and coarse” “model” is in reality utterly inappropriate for Chinese agriculture. It also runs counter to the insights of the deep and weighty tradition of scholarship and theorizing about genuine peasant family farming. The correct path for Chinese agricultural development is the appropriately scaled, “small and fine” genuine family farms that have already arisen quite widely in the past 30 years.
  • Between Informal Mediation and Formal Adjudication: The Third Realm of Qing Civil Justice

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
  • Women’s Choices under the Law: Marriage, Divorce, and Illicit Sex in the Qing and the Republic

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
    This article examines separately Qing and Republican Chinese law’s constructions of women’s will, and uses each to illuminate the other. Qing law’s construction, though differing greatly from the Guomindang’s Republican law that modelled itself after the 1900 German Civil Code, nevertheless did not view women simply as passive entities devoid of will and choice, but rather as beings who chose between “consenting to” and resisting abusive treatment—what this article terms “passive agency.” That codified construction is most clearly revealed in a series of provisos centering on the word he,“consenting to.” Guomindang law, by contrast, on the basis of imported Western laws and legal principles, constructed women as completely independent entities possessing an autonomous will. This article also examines actual legal practice on the basis of 193 (what are termed by archivists) “marriage-related” (or “marriage and illicit sex”) cases collected by the author. What is surprising is that although Qing law made harsh demands on abused women (they must resist at any cost, lest they be suspected of the criminal offenses of consenting to illicit sex, to being seduced, to being abducted, and the like), it also gave them important protections, whereas the Guomindang’s “modern” constructions of women eliminated those protections. On balance, Qing law actually afforded women who were in weak positions more protection than Guomindang law.
  • Editor’s Introduction to The History and Theory of Legal Practice in China: Toward a Historical-Social Jurisprudence

    Philip C. C. Huang 2014/07/17
  • Editor’s Introduction

    Philip C. C. Huang 2014/07/17
  • "Social Sciences of Practice” Series Foreword

    Philip C. C. Huang 2014/07/17
  • The Basis for the Legitimacy of the Chinese Political System: Whence and Whither? Dialogues among Western and Chinese Scholars, VII -- Editor’s Introduction

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
  • Rural China: An International Journal of History and Social Science Volume 10 (2013)

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
  • Development "Planning" in Present-Day China--System, Process, and Mechanism: Dialogues among Western and Chinese Scholars, VI

    Philip C. C. Huang 2013/12/02
  • Profit-Making State Firms and China's Development Experience:"State Capitalism" or "Socialist Market Economy"?

    Philip C. C. Huang 2013/05/23
  • "State Capitalism" or "Socialist Market Economy"?--Editor's Foreword

    Philip C. C. Huang 2013/05/23
  • Misleading Chinese Legal and Statistical Categories: Labor, Individual Entities, and Private Enterprises

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
    The mixing of socialist and capitalist discourses in Reform China has engendered some complex and misleading usages of key legal and statistical categories. This article considers three in particular: “labor,” “individual entities,” and “private enterprises.” The meaning of the word “labor” has changed from its early days’ meaning of the “working class” in a Marxist revolutionary perspective into a relatively privileged group classified along with government officials as “employees-workers” who are under the protection of formal labor laws and regulations. The category in fact excludes the great majority of China’s laboring people today, who work mainly in the informal economy, considered to belong outside the official legal-statistical category of “employees-workers” and formal “labor relations,” and to belong rather under casual or “task-based labor relations,” not covered by the state’s labor laws. “Individual entities,” on the other hand, includes mainly self-employed artisans, peddlers, and service workers closely tied to peasants, even as it includes also a minority of new-style shops and eateries, higher-paying service entities, and other individual businesses. As for “private enterprises,” it includes mainly small-scale businesses that currently employ an average of just 13–15 people and does not include the larger private and part-private firms. They are also as a rule not formally incorporated as limited liability companies with separate “legal person” status and are therefore not considered legal “employing units” that are involved in “labor relations.” As will be seen, literal usage of these terms according to their surface meanings in English without consideration of the complex historical backgrounds and changes in the categories can lead to some serious misunderstandings of Chinese realities, as has occurred in even some of the best scholarly studies of China—by Ching Kwan Lee, Kellee Tsai, and Yasheng Huang.
  • Capitalization without Proletarianization in China's Agricultural Development

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
    Marxist as well as classical and neo-liberal theories expect that the development
    of capitalist agriculture will be accompanied by the spread of an agricultural
    proletariat. That was what happened in eighteenth-century England; it is
    also what is happening in contemporary India. This article asks, first of all: just
    what is the size of China’s present agricultural proletariat? And how do we
    understand and explain those dimensions? Our finding is that, contrary to our
    own initial expectations, hired agricultural year-workers in China today total
    only 3 percent of all labor input in agriculture (and short-term workers another
    0.4 percent), in sharp contrast to India’s 45 percent, this even while the past
    two decades have seen very substantial “capitalization” (i.e., increased capital
    input per unit of land) in agriculture. We term the phenomenon “capitalization
    without proletarianization,” perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of recent
    Chinese agricultural development.
  • A Brief Comment on Ivan Szelenyi’s Comment

    Philip C. C. Huang 2015/07/02
    Ivan Szelenyi argues that no third way alternatives to capitalist market economy
    and socialist planned economy are possible, a conclusion he reached
    after his own searches for such dating back to the 1980s. My comment
    responds to his two main points, about a “real estate bubble,” and hence
    the non-sustainability of Chongqing’s third finance, and the historical failures
    of third ways in Eastern Europe and Russia, and hence the likelihood of the
    same failure in Chongqing and in China.