China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald

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China's modernization has bred a technocracy that, at least in the near term, discourages mass involvement in elite competition. The Chinese government at all levels was largely restaffed in the 1980s. During the first six years of that decade, more than 1,370,000 senior cadres, all recruited before 1949, were retired. At the same time, more than 469,000 college-educated younger cadres, mainly engineers by training, came to leadership positions above the county level (Renmin ribao, October 11, 1987: 1 and June 29, 1986:1). Most promoted cadres were "technocrats" (professionals with technical training, usually in science, that legitimized their claims to offices of power). But these technical elites split in 1989. Many leaders of the dissident movement had earlier written approvingly of their own technocratic elitism. The main reform journal of the 1980s, the Shanghai-based *World Economic Herald*, claimed that China's modern strength depended on rule

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by scientists and engineers. This article shows the surprising extent of anti-democratic ideals in the *Herald*; it also shows that both government technocrats and dissident intellectuals tend to neglect the democratizing effect of the conflict between themselves.

Modern change has specialized China's leaders, without soon requiring them to strive for popular mandates. Ever since the May Fourth Movement, Chinese intellectuals have thought "Mr. Science" must be a friend of "Mr. Democracy," without noting the undemocratic claims to power that scientists can make. The *World Economic Herald* became the intellectuals' main beacon of reforms, leading to the 1989 student rallies. The *Herald* was closed in May 1989 by Jiang Zemin, then Party head of Shanghai (soon thereafter the Party's General Secretary). Several editors and many writers of the newspaper were arrested after the June Fourth tragedy. The government claimed implicitly that the 1989 student demonstrations resulted from a "conspiracy between the newspaper, the students, and Zhao Ziyang" (Jiang, 1990; Feng, 1989; Butterfield, 1989; Shi, 1989). The *Herald* was condemned as a "hotbed" of rebellion and a "trumpet" of an international reactionary "cantata" (Xin, 1989). Dissident intellectuals, for their part, praised the *Herald* as a "forerunner of the Chinese democratic movement" (You, 1989; Zhuang, 1989).

Similarly, in the second decade of this century, the radical journal for intellectuals *Xin qingnian* (New Youth) disseminated Marxism; many founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party, such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, were writers for *Xin qingnian*. Chinese Communists clearly understood Lenin's famous dictum: "a newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator, but also a collective organizer (Lenin, 1927: 114). This political and organizational role for journalism is by no means unique to China. Scholars of East European countries have found that newspapers run by dissident intellectuals were a catalytic force for change there (Albright, 1983). The link between government and press in socialist countries is important to the extent that communist power, as Zbigniew Brzezinski says, "is based, above all, on thought control" (1983: v). The Communist Party in China, as in many other socialist countries, is clearly losing this control. One of the strongest challenges to it in the 1980s came from the *World Economic Herald*.

How and under what circumstances did the *Herald* emerge? What values did the paper present throughout its existence, from 1980 to 1989? A major aim of this article is to show that Chinese political development in the 1980s was primarily technocratic. People with three traits—scientific training, professional occupations, and actual or putative positions of power because of their education and profession—are called "technocrats." Few top posts in China were filled by such people in 1978; but dramatic shifts in cadre policy had promoted technocrats, within a decade, to practically all of China's top posts (Li and White, 1988, 1990). This change was part of an elitist movement in which the *World Economic Herald* played a critical role. A movement of this kind was not unified (by 1989, it was obviously split between hardline and would-be liberal technocrats). But it reflects shared beliefs and activities through most of the 1980s.

Such currents are usually dominated by new political elites with novel claims to legitimacy (Gusfield, 1970: 2). China's technocratic movement was inspired by the belief that national progress depends on technological development; thus, experts should rule. After the Cultural Revolution, Chinese intellectuals and political leaders often spoke of a "new technological revolution"—an imported notion that technical progress fundamentally changes all societies, whether socialist or capitalist. All intellectuals benefitted from this notion, and those with technical educations benefitted most. Older military generalists still could assert their influence in times of crisis; but most were retired, and, at many high and intermediate levels of China's political system, even the conservatives generally had scientific degrees. The *Herald* represented political forces in society; it did not act independently, but became the main journal of China's technocratic movement.[1]

The *Herald* did not consistently act as a dissident institution. Its editors portrayed the *Herald* as independent from its founding; it was relatively free from institutional links to the government (Hsiao and Yang, 1989). But this view obscures complex relationships that often put the *Herald* closer to Zhao Ziyang's administration than were other newspapers. The *Herald* had a very powerful board of directors and

advisors, including the mayor and vice mayor of Shanghai, members of the Central Committee of the Party, and directors of special commissions under the State Council. Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli was a "bureau-level" (*juji*, i.e., high) cadre. The paper's goals were inherently governmental. In nine years of publication, its stress on the "global scientific revolution" and its advocacy of Alvin Toffler's "third wave" were closely related to many official policies on elite transformation in post-Mao China. Not only were members of Zhao Ziyang's "think tanks" wont to present their bold new ideas in this newspaper, technocrats in the 1990 Politburo (for example, Li Tieying and Ding Guan'gen) had also often written for the newspaper. Leading figures involved on all sides of the 1989 political confrontation were incumbent technocrats (Premier Li Peng and General Secretary Jiang Zemin, were both engineers by training), former technocrats (dissident astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, mathematician Yan Jiaqi, and chemist Wen Yuankai), and potential technocrats (many student leaders). China's technical elites split among themselves in 1989, and the *Herald* changed from the Zhao Ziyang government's favorite newspaper into a dissident journal.

The 1989 anti-government movement and its subsequent suppression reveal many paradoxes. First, the government in 1989-1990 adopted an extremely harsh policy toward some critical intellectuals and called for government reliance on the working class—but all top officials were still recruited from among other intellectuals (who in China are formally defined as people having any tertiary education, even though broader colloquial usages of the term "intellectuals" are sometimes heard). Second, of those involved in the demonstrations, only workers have been publicly executed. Many of the intellectual elite have been arrested, interrogated, terrorized, and repressed—but the deaths have been overwhelmingly among the non-elite. Third, dissident intellectuals have made distinct appeals for democracy—but they have also explicitly advocated elitism (Schwarcz, 1989; Delfs 1988; Chan and Unger, 1990). These seeming contradictions can be reconciled if Chinese politics are seen as increasingly technocratic, despite divisions by generation, policy, and faction.

THE HERALD *AS AN INTELLECTUAL CLUSTER: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS*

The *Herald* may be described as a "cluster" of loosely linked intellectuals. This cluster was reflected not only in its personnel, contributors, and readership, but also in its social activities such as lectures and conferences for intellectuals and political leaders. The *Herald* had a distinguished, well-established beginning, and all its activities involved the elite rather than the masses.

PERSONNEL

The *Herald* was founded in June 1980 by Qian Junrui and Qin Benli, who served respectively as the director and editor-in-chief. It was officially affiliated with both the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Association of World Economics. Qian and Qin had similar professional backgrounds and political experience, so the paper evinced their personal aspirations and political philosophies. Both were eminent scholars who had started their careers as journalists before 1949. They joined the Chinese Communist Party in their late twenties or early thirties and held important leadership positions. Qian was successively the Beijing Bureau Chief of Xinhua News Agency, Vice Minister of Culture, an alternate member of the Party's Central Committee, and a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference. Qin also held high positions: Executive Deputy Chief Editor and Party Secretary of *Wenhui bao*, Associate Director of the Shanghai Institute of World Economy, and member of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Peoples' Political Consultative Conference.

Both were persecuted in Mao's time. As early as 1957, Qin was forced to leave his positions at *Wenhui bao* when Mao Zedong charged that newspaper had a "bourgeois orientation." During the Cultural Revolution, Qin was held in custody for two years. Qian was also arrested twice in his lifetime: He was sent to a Guomindang jail in the 1940s, then to a Communist prison for eight years during the late 1960s and early 1970s. They were both rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution, and both (particularly Qian) were well respected as academic economists. Qin became Associate Director of the Shanghai

Institute of World Economy, and Qian was Professor of Economics at Beijing University and Director of the Institute of World Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

When the newspaper was founded in 1980, Qian was already 72 years old and Qin was also over 60. The average age of the editorial board was 63. In 1983, the *Herald* established its board of directors and advisory council, which were composed of eminent scholars such as Xue Muqiao, Huan Xiang, Ma Hong, and Yu Guangyuan. Table 1 lists the names and positions of the *Herald*'s board of directors and advisory council in 1983. Former Shanghai mayor Wang Daohan served as the board's Honorary Chairman. Several directors of special commissions and centers under the State Council were also board members or advisors to the *Herald.* This newspaper distinguished itself from many others by its close association with leading national scholars and political elites. Probably only the *Renmin ribao*, the national organ of the Chinese Communist Party, could compete with the *Herald* in terms of the scholarly distinction and official status of its directors and editorial personnel.

The *Herald* underwent major institutional changes in the mid-1980s. Qian Junrui, the newspaper's first and last president, died in 1985. Although some senior advisors such as Yu Guangyuan, Xue Muqiao, and Ma Hong continued to be influential as both government top experts and frequent *Herald* columnists, they were not much involved in the paper's administrative or editorial work. The old editors retired in the middle of the decade, while young intellectuals became the core of the newspaper. By 1989, the average age of the *Herald*'s editorial board was 38—a sharp contrast to 63, the average age of the board in 1980 when the newspaper was founded (*Herald*, February 27, 1989: 3; hereafter all dates without source refer to the *Herald*). Table 2 lists the *Herald*'s board in 1988. With the exception of Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli, all other editors were in their thirties or early forties. Although they lacked the official prestige or government positions of their predecessors, most had university educations (and some had formal training in journalism). Many had grown up in the 1960s and had been Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Several were in the first (1981) class of college students who graduated after the national exams for higher education resumed during late

TABLE 1: Board of Directors & Advisory Council of the *World Economic Herald* (1983)

Name	*Position in the Paper*	*Other Positions*
Qin Benli	Editor-in-Chief Vice Director	Associate Director, Institute of World Economy, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; Standing Committee Member of Shanghai Peoples' Political Consultative Conference
Qian Junrui	President	Director, Institute of World Economy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; President, Society of World Economics; Standing Committee Member of Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference
Huan Xiang	Honorary Director	Director, International Studies Center, State Council; Standing Committee Member of the National People's Congress; President, International Law Society
Wang Daohan	Honorary Director	Mayor of Shanghai
Xue Muqiao	Senior Advisor	Standing Committee Member of Chinese Peoples' Political Consultive Conference; Director General, Economic Research Center, State Council
Xu Dixin	Senior Advisor	Standing Committee Member of Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference; Honorary President, Society of Foreign Economic Theories
Yu Guangyuan	Senior Advisor	Member of Central Advisory Commission of the Chinese Communist Party; President, Society of Territorial Economics; Vice President, China International Cultural Exchange Center
Ma Hong	Senior Advisor	Alternate Member, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; Director General, Technical Economics Research Center, State Council
Xu Xuehan	Senior Advisor	Director, Economic Research Center, State Council
Sun Huairen	Senior Advisor	Vice President, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
Chu Baoyi	Senior Advisor	Director, Society of World Economics
Xin Yuanxi	Director	Vice Mayor of Shanghai

seventies. Some were also children of high-ranking officials. Chen Lepo's father, for instance, had headed the Party's United Front Work Department in Shanghai. These young people were bolder in their political activities—and more radical in their elitist views—than their predecessors in the newspaper.

TABLE 2: Board of Editors of the *World Economic Herald* (1988)

Name	*Age*	*Educational Background*	*Position in the Paper*
Qin Benli	70	Chaoyang College, Beijing	Editor-in-Chief
Zhu Xingqing	early 40s	High school education	Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Fan Jun	early 40s	College education	Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Chen Hansheng	early 30s	College education	Head of International News Dept.
Chen Lebo	39	Fudan University	Head of Chinese Economic News Dept.
Lu Yi	32	College education	Head of Front-Page News Dept.
Chen Hongbing	30	Fudan University, Journalism	Head of Theoretical Affairs Dept.
Zhang Weiguo	35	East China Institute of Political Science & Law	Head of Beijing Bureau
Xu Xiaowei	30	College education	Head of Guangzhou Bureau
Shen Feihao	early 30s	College education	Editor
Ruan Jiangning	early 30s	People's University, Journalism	Editor
Chen Danhong	early 30s	Fudan University, Journalism	Editor
He Ling	35	College education	Editor

The *Herald* dealt with the world as well as China. It sent three articulate correspondents abroad: Pan Muping to Washington, D.C., Zhao Wendou to Tokyo, and Hu Houfa to Vienna. In addition, a number of Chinese students or visiting scholars in the United States, Great Britain, and other countries served as special reporters. For example, Huan Guocang, then a graduate student at Princeton University, and Zhu Zhuanyi, a senior fellow in the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and visiting scholar at the University of California at Berkeley, frequently wrote for the *Herald* in the middle of the 1980s. By 1984, the *Herald* published Zhu Zhuanyi's series entitled "Changes in an American Small Town Brought by the New Technological Revolution" (April 9, 1984: 8; April 16, 1984: 3, April 30, 1984: 3; and May 7, 1984: 3). These reports, based on the author's observations in Marlborough, Massachusetts, spurred Chinese intellectuals to debate a "new technological revolution." The *Herald*'s articles by scholars abroad became an important source of foreign ideas.

READERSHIP

The *Herald* was run *by* intellectuals, and it was primarily *about* and *for* intellectuals. In terms of mass circulation, the *Herald* could not be considered a major newspaper. Table 3 shows that its distribution fluctuated, but hardly ever exceeded, 300,000. For a weekly, this number was insignificant in Shanghai, let alone all China (White, 1989a). The importance of the *Herald* lay in the composition of its readership. As Qin Benli plainly told an American journalist, the target audience was mainly the political elite, scholars, and entrepreneurs (February 27, 1989: 3). This paper was not propaganda for ordinary people, but some top leaders openly recommended it to members of the elite. Ren Zhongyi, the First Party Secretary of Guangdong, and Guo Feng, the First Party Secretary of Liaoning, sent memoranda to government officials in their provinces, urging them to read the *Herald* regularly (August 19, 1984: 1).

Undergraduate and graduate students were also numerous among the newspaper's readers. One student at Beijing Business School wrote to the editor in 1982, saying that of the fifty students in his class, thirty-seven subscribed to the *Herald* (June 21, 1982: 7). Students' enthusiasm for the *Herald* by the spring of 1989 was nothing new.

LECTURES

The *Herald* disseminated technocratic values not only through publications, but also through the talks and "Sunday Lectures" it sponsored. The recurrent themes of these talks were "new technological revolution," developments in the world economy, and the critical role of intellectuals for China's reform. Many talks were held in the Shanghai Science Hall, and most listeners were college students. Sometimes the number of attendants exceeded the seating capacity of the hall; the talk would then be moved to another location or repeated. Wen Yuankai's speech on his impressions of educational and technical systems in nine Western countries, for instance, was so popular that all tickets were sold within hours after its announcement, so the lecture was repeated on the following Sunday.

TABLE 3: Circulation of the *World Economic Herald*

Year	*Number of Pages*	*Average Circulation*	*Total Number of Issues Distributed*
1980	12	NA	NA
1981	12	100,000	NA
1982	12	89,000	4,959,000
1983	12	264,900	13,774,800
1984	8	303,500	15,138,800
1985	12	196,700	10,100,000
1986	16	142,000	7,265,000
1987	16	300,000?	NA
1988	16	300,000?	NA
1989	16	300,000	NA

SOURCE: *Zhongguo xinwen nianjian* Research Institute of Journalism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, comp., (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Publishing House), 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.

CONFERENCES

In addition to organizing talks, the *Herald* sponsored conferences in various cities. Table 4 lists these meetings. Newspaper backing for conferences in post-Mao China was not unique to the *Herald*—many journals run by provinces or ministries hosted them—but three characteristics distinguished the *Herald*'s meetings. First, scholars were always a major audience. Particularly in 1988 and 1989, academics became almost the only people to participate at conferences held by the *Herald*. Second, in contrast to other newspapers, which organized conferences in their own cities, the *Herald* did not restrict its influence to one locality. Its sessions met in Wuhan, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and many cities of East China. Some symposia were televised nationwide. In its final two years, the *Herald* held all its conferences in Beijing. Third, the topics of these conferences were all reform-oriented. The three conferences held in 1989 were watched not only by intellectuals and students, but also by top leaders including Deng, Zhao, and Li. These meetings were critically important to Chinese politics during that period. As some observers pointed out, the *Herald*'s Beijing Bureau became a center of dissident forces. The April, 1989, conferences on "Democracy, Science, and Modernization" and "Hu Yaobang Lives in Our Hearts" helped set the agenda for the anti-government

TABLE 4: Conferences Sponsored or Co-sponsored by the *World Economic Herald*

Date	*Location*	*Theme*	*Main Attendants*
82.5	Shanghai	Strategies for Shanghai economic development	Municipal officials and scholars
82.5	Shanghai	China's foreign economic relations	Municipal officials and scholars
82.4	Wuhan	China's foreign economic relations and domestic regional development	Provincial officials and scholars
82.4.30	Fuzhou	Foreign investment and technology transfer	Provincial officials and scholars
82.5.14	Guangzhou	Exports and imports	Provincial officials and scholars
82.7.8	Tianjin	China's foreign economic relations	Municipal officials and scholars
82.8.31	Beijing	China's foreign economic relations	Municipal officials
82.8.28	Shenyang	China's foreign economic relations	Provincial officials and scholars
83.4.5	Shanghai	Theoretical aspects of the planning for the Shanghai Economic zone (1)	Municipal officials and scholars
83.8.8	Ningbo	Theoretical aspects of the planning for the Shanghai Economic Zone (2)	Provincial officials and scholars
84.1.9	Shanghai	The Fourth Industrial Revolution	Municipal officials and scholars
84.3.26	Wuxi	Theoretical aspects of the planning for the Shanghai Economic Zone (3)	Provincial officials and scholars
84.6.20	Shanghai	Personnel training for foreign trade	Scholars
84.9	Zhejiang	Symposium of young and middle-age economists	Young & middle-age economists
84.11	Beijing	Reform and opening	Young scholars (televised)
84.12	Shanghai	The prospects of the Pacific Region and China's modernization	Scholars
85.2	Hefei	Theoretical aspects of the planning for the Shanghai Economic Zone (4)	Provincial officials and scholars
88.3.22	Beijing	Domestic enterprise groups and international cooperation and competition	Scholars and officials
88.7.23	Beijing	Where will reform go?	Scholars and officials (televised)
88.9	Beijing	Issues concerning intellectuals	Scholars
88.9	Beijing	The future of reform	Young scholars
89.3	Beijing	Democratic development in China	Scholars
89.4	Beijing	Democracy, science, and modernization	Scholars
89.4	Beijing	Hu Yaobang lives in our hearts	Scholars and officials

demonstrations that directly followed (You, 1989; Jiang, 1989). This explains why the regime's first response to the unrest in April and May was not to crack down on student demonstrators at Tiananmen or Xinhuamen, but to suppress this Shanghai-based newspaper (Wright, 1990). Soon after the June Fourth tragedy, three prominent young members of the *Herald*'s editorial board, Zhang Weiguo (Head of the Beijing Bureau), Xu Xiaowei (Head of Guangzhou Bureau), and Chen Lebo (Head of Chinese Economic News Department) were arrested. The conservatives began to neutralize communications among their elite rivals before dealing with the mass demonstrations.

INTERVIEWS

One of the most important tactics the *Herald* used during its heyday was to interview famous and powerful figures. In his study of journalism in another country, Lloyd Tataryn claimed "the golden rule" for reporters is to "quote somebody." He said the "reporter was now first and foremost an objective interviewer. Knowing whom to quote in a key situation became part of one's expertise" (1985: 31). The *Herald* scored well in this area—and strikingly so, because interview reporting had seldom been used in the Chinese press before the 1980s. In a country where all voices are supposed to be consistent with the Party line and all policies are announced through Party documents, there might be no reason to interview people, but this gradually changed in post-Mao China. An interview with a scientific "expert" is already a medium with a message.

Table 5 surveys the *Herald*'s interviews. These became more frequent over the years, from fourteen in 1981 to eighty-seven in 1988. The *Herald* interviewed more foreigners than Chinese, particularly in the early period. Overseas interviewees were often scholarly experts in social sciences such as Milton Friedman, Alvin Toffler, and Samuel Huntington, Western China watchers such as A. Doak Barnett, Michel Oksenburg, and Harry Harding, and well-known Chinese-American scholars such as Zou Dang (Tang Tsou), Li Zhengdao (C. T. Lee), and Zou Zhizhuang (Gregory Chow). Foreign officials interviewed included former Hungarian communist party boss Rezso Nyers, former

TABLE 5: Occupations of People Interviewed by the *World Economic Herald*

Interview	*1980**	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*	*1987*	*1988*	*1989**	*Total*
Chinese**											
Officials	0	3	6	11	7	7	2	12	9	7	64 (19%)
Scholars	0	2	4	9	1	3	4	10	17	9	59 (18%)
Entrepreneurs	0	0	1	2	3	3	1	2	2	3	17 (5%)
Other	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 (1%)
Subtotal	(0)	(5)	(12)	(24)	(11)	(13)	(7)	(24)	(28)	(19)	143 (43%)
Foreign											
Officals	0	2	1	3	2	5	2	11	18	3	47 (14%)
Scholars	3	6	7	5	8	10	11	17	31	6	104 (31%)
Entrepreneurs	1	1	3	5	2	1	2	11	10	2	38 (11%)
Other	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	4 (1%)
Subtotal	(4)	(9)	(12)	(13)	(12)	(18)	(16)	(39)	(59)	(11)	193 (57%)
Total	4	14	24	37	23	31	23	63	87	30	336 (100%)

*The *Herald* was first published in June 1980 and was closed in early May 1989; data from 1980 or 1989 are not fully comparable with those of other years.
**This refers to Chinese citizens only. Overseas Chinese are considered as foreigners.

U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, and ambassadors from many countries including the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Australia.

Fully 82% of interviewees were academics or civilian officials, and 16% were entrepreneurs. Other people, who might be identified with mass groups, including workers, farmers, and soldiers, amounted to only 2%. These biases were clearly related to the newspaper's technical elitism. The journalists of the *Herald* built an authoritative, scientific image for their paper, and to this end they also interviewed top politicians such as Li Tieying and Chen Muhua (who both remained in the cabinet after June Fourth), as well as provincial and ministerial leaders. Because of the journal's prestige, some officials were enthusiastic about being interviewed by the *Herald*. Ren Zhongyi, First Party Secretary of Guangdong, personally phoned and then visited the *Herald*'s Guangzhou Bureau for his interview.

In its final two years of publication, the *Herald* interviewed more elite scholars than government officials—and most of these intellectuals were regarded abroad as dissidents. Zhang Weiguo, the *Herald*'s Beijing bureau head, was remarkably active in this effort. Almost every issue of the newspaper during these years contained an article or interview by Zhang. His interlocutors included Li Honglin, Yan Jiaqi, Zhang Zhonghou, Su Shaozhi, Li Zehou, Wen Yuankai, Wang Yizhou, Li Yining, and various other prominent non-conformist thinkers. The ability of this very academic group to keep its prestige, while publicizing its disagreements with conservatives whose mass base in cities was also infirm, shows much about the social structure of China's political system.

Not only did the *Herald* frequently interview those who were to be repressed after June Fourth, it also printed many of their articles. Most of these intellectuals emerged after 1986. More established elderly figures such as Xu Dixin, Xue Muqiao, Luo Yuanzheng, Ma Hong, Qian Xuesen, and Wu Dakun wrote for the newspaper in its early years, but then gradually gave way to the younger generation. This change partly reflects the age structure of China's intellectuals, and it also shows the evolving relationship between the *Herald* and government leaders, who themselves became more divided as the reforms created fiscal and other problems (White, 1989c). The bases of polit-

ical splits between reformist and conservative technocrats will be treated below. But first, a content analysis can show that, despite such divisions, most of the *Herald*'s writers were explicit elitists in the sense that they believed that China's modernization requires the leadership of technocrats.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

The *World Economic Herald*, true to its name, began as a newspaper that focused on economic affairs abroad. The two stated aims of the newspaper were "to help China understand the world and to help the world understand China" (February 27, 1989: 3). The paper's domestic role was clearly more important than its international function. The *Herald* flourished at a time when China was gradually opening to new ideas, values, and information from outside after decades of isolation. The flow of news was determined not only by the inherent importance of events, but also by the values of the *Herald*'s reporters. Students of journalism point out that news cannot simply be a "recovery of obvious facts," because facts are not necessarily obvious. They are subject to journalists' selectivity, which depends on making judgments (Tataryn, 1985: 21). As James Curran and Jean Seaton have observed, "the popular image of journalists as intrepid hunters after hidden truths is hardly realistic" (1988: 235).

This selectivity by journalists can have a significant effect on public perceptions of "important issues" facing society and "trends towards the future" (Fletcher, 1981: 16). Even in Mao's era, as both Lucian Pye and Chin-Chuan Lee have observed, China's mass media not only voiced official slogans but "occasionally acted as a forum for advocating policy changes and alternatives" (Pye, 1978; cf. Lee, 1981). The ordering of news items and topical changes over time tell much about the values and politics of political elites and journalists.

Table 6 surveys the content of the *World Economic Herald* through its whole run (June 1980 to May 1989). Altogether, 15,903 items are categorized in four large sections: international, domestic, regional-Shanghai, and other.[2] This survey only provides a thematic distribution by numbers, not by importance. A content analysis of the "top stories"

is also needed. The top story is defined by the largest headline on the front page, and these leading news items from all 441 issues of the *Herald* are divided into four geographic scopes, as well as four subjects. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution, while Figure 2 indicates the distribution of lead story subjects. What did the *Herald* try to emphasize? How did the stress change over the nine years of publication? How did the *Herald* break into forbidden topics? Did the *Herald* have consistent themes? These figures begin to give the answers.

Two parallel shifts are evident in the *Herald*: 1) a move from international to domestic topics, and 2) from economics to politics. The percentage of international news among the total items dropped from 57% in 1980 to 39% in 1989, while domestic news jumped from 26% to 54%. This shift is even more striking if we look only at the top story. Figure 1 shows that the portion of domestic top stories jumped from 39% in 1980 to 90% in 1989, while the percentage of international lead topics declined from 46% in 1980 to only 5% in 1989. The regional-Shanghai section, which includes news about other provinces' local affairs, occupied only a marginal portion throughout the nine years. In international news, tremendous attention was given to the USA, Japan, and Western European countries, while the newspaper showed a clear lack of interest in the Third World countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. News items on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe greatly increased after the middle of the 1980s, when Gorbachev took power.

The second shift was within the domestic news section. Table 6 and Figure 2 show a dramatic increase in news on political affairs, and a relative decrease in economic news, by the late 1980s. With few exceptions, the *Herald* did not touch on very sensitive political issues until 1986. Before that year, it published two politically provocative articles: an essay advocating humanitarianism (*rendao zhuyi*) by Deng Pufang, Deng Xiaoping's son, and a piece about "fighting for freedom" by Hu Deping, son of Hu Yaobang, then the Party General Secretary (December 31, 1984: 10). These were very safe, governmentalist authors. The reports on economic affairs in the early years, however, also had political implications. As Zhu Xingqing, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the *Herald*, told a Voice of America reporter, there

TABLE 6: Contents of the *World Economic Herald* (Items)

Subject Year	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*87*	*88*	*89*	*Total*	
International Section												
General News	101	190	149	194	167	199	238	231	128	26	1623	10.2%
West (General)	16	38	33	42	20	19	15	31	13	2	229	1.4%
USA	44	150	139	73	103	147	129	116	92	17	1010	6.4%
Canada	1	2	10	4	7	2	1	7	4		38	0.2%
Western Europe	24	120	86	83	70	102	108	104	91	8	796	5.0%
Australia & New Zealand	5	2	6	4	4	8	1	9	6		45	0.2%
Japan	31	94	97	65	67	84	75	83	47	16	659	4.1%
Eastern Europe	21	15	29	63	46	83	57	85	106	23	528	3.3%
USSR	3	18	22	35	32	49	80	82	100	24	445	2.8%
Third World (General)	2	9	17	10	5	9	10	6	3		71	0.4%
Asia	4	27	37	24	28	40	77	75	78	11	401	2.5%
Africa	1	10	26	24	11	16	13	17	2	1	121	0.7%
Latin America	1	23	71	20	13	26	31	28	10	2	225	1.4%
Subtotal	254	698	722	641	573	784	835	874	680	130	6191	38.9%
	(57%)	(51%)	(42%)	(34%)	(32%)	(40%)	(36%)	(39%)	(36%)	(39%)	(38.9%)	
Domestic Section												
Economic	42	271	393	558	701	780	857	794	628	109	5133	32.3%
Political					2	5	70	83	119	53	332	2.1%
Social & Cultural		28	10	109	77	45	130	59	82	11	551	3.5%
Foreign Relations & Trade	73	95	120	78	99	106	133	137	108	7	956	6.0%
Subtotal	115	394	523	745	879	936	1190	1073	937	180	6972	43.8%
	(26%)	(29%)	(31%)	(39%)	(48%)	(48%)	(51%)	(48%)	(50%)	(54%)	(43.8%)	

Regional-Shanghai Section												
Subtotal	4	35	294	341	231	77	110	76	26	6	1200	7.5%
	(1%)	(3%)	(17%)	(18%)	(13%)	(4%)	(5%)	(3%)	(1%)	(2%)	(7.5%)	
Other												
Theoretical Issues	12	73	72	54	35	40	66	83	69	9	513	3.2%
Academic Activities	24	93	41	34	31	23	29	28	50	3	356	2.2%
Portraits	24	80	36	35	35	70	86	66	73	5	510	3.2%
Book Reviews	12	8	12	23	31	10	13	20	30	2	161	1.0%
Subtotal	72	254	161	146	132	143	194	197	222	19	1540	9.7%
	(16%)	(18%)	(9%)	(8%)	(7%)	(7%)	(8%)	(9%)	(12%)	(6%)	(9.7%)	
Total	445	1381	1700	1873	1815	1940	2329	2220	1865	335	15903	100%
	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	

SOURCE: The data primarily come from the index of the *World Economic Herald*, except for the issues in 1989. This index is not categorized in a consistent manner, so some subject entries are rearranged. Each item is one entry, regardless of its length. Special columns such as "Advertisements," "Self-Study College," "Readers' Forum," "International Financial Market," "References," and "Statistics" are excluded.



Figure 1: Top Stories in the *Herald*: More Domestic, Less International (Percentage)



Figure 2: Top Stories in the *Herald*: More Politics, Less Economics (Percentage)

was no clear distinction between economic and political news; the former often suggested the latter (November 11, 1985: 3; also Hsiao and Yang, 1989: 5). The year 1986 was crucial for shifts in the *Herald*'s emphasis, because the journalists then became bolder in discussing national controversies. One author even wrote that the *Herald* should be more of a "political herald" (*zhengzhi daobao*) than an "economic herald" (May 16, 1988: 1).

These changes did not mean the *Herald* lacked a coherent theme. On the contrary, reports about the wonder of technological revolution recurred often. These themes were fully consistent with basic Marxist doctrine. Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli, during his visit to the United States in February 1989, told A. Doak Barnett, Harry Harding, and other China specialists that a constant principle of the *Herald* was to reflect the "voices of Chinese intellectuals" (February 5, 1989: 3). Reports concerning technocratic views were often under the "Chinese domestic" section or other subsections, and Alvin Toffler's "third wave" was intensively discussed. Two chapters of Toffler's *Prediction and Prerequisite* were translated as a series for the *Herald* in 1984. Other Western theories of development, such as Joseph Schumpeter's "technological innovation" and N. D. Kondratieff's "long waves," were also enthusiastically reviewed by the journal (January 30, 1984: 11; October 8, 1984: 4).

Technocratic ideas were disseminated by many prominent Chinese scholars too. The *Herald* devoted an entire page or more to articles such as: "The New Technological Revolution and China's Measures" by Huan Xiang, an almost identically titled article by Ma Hong, "Some Thoughts on the World's New Technological Revolution" by Lu Jiaxi, "The Development of Science and Technology as the First Priority in Economic Growth" by Wu Mingyu, and "Building a Country on the Basis of Technological Development: A World Proposition of Universal Significance" by Feng Shaokui (July 30, 1984: 6-7; August 6, 1984: 10; May 21, 1984: 7; August 19, 1985: 1; December 8, 1986: 11; November 16, 1987: 13; and April 4, 1988:1). Almost all these writers held a realpolitik, nationalistic viewpoint. Authors emphasized the determining role of technical development in the rise or fall of nations, including China. According to Feng Shaokui, for example, technological competitiveness is the core of national capacity. He wrote that the economic miracle of post-war Japan was largely a result of Japan's strategy of building a country on the basis of technical development (*keji liguo*, November 16, 1987: 13).

A leading advocate for Chinese technocracy is Qian Xuesen, who had earned a Ph.D. in aerodynamics at the California Institute of Technology and was a protégé of Theodore von Karman, a scholar of

modern mechanics. Qian taught at MIT as a professor of aerospace engineering in the 1940s; he returned to China in 1955, later serving as China's premier expert on guided missiles and space technology. He also served as a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. By 1990, he was Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and Chairman of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology. Although Qian was never officially affiliated with the *Herald*, he wrote for it frequently (July 19, 1982: 2; October 10, 1983: 2, April 2, 1984: 3; April 9, 1984: 3 and 8; and March 28, 1988: 1). This newspaper first brought out his proposal that, by the year 2000, all cadres must be college graduates, all leaders at the county or bureau level must hold M.A. degrees, and all full or deputy ministers and provincial governors must hold Ph.D. degrees (October 10, 1983: 2). Western academics may find it hard to conceive how anyone could idealize a country run by Ph.D.'s, but Qian advocated this, and the *Herald* published it.

Data from Taiwan show Qian's proposal is less visionary in a Chinese place than it might be elsewhere. By 1988, doctorates were actually held by 26% of the GMD Central Committee, and by 58% of the Taiwan cabinet (Li and White, 1990: 9-10). In a series of 1984 articles, Qian also argued more broadly that a worldwide technological revolution called for new political values. He likened the government to a "designing department" in aerospace engineering, so that it should be mainly composed of scientists and engineers (April 9, 1984: 8). In 1988, Qian appealed for renewing China through science and technology (*keji xingguo*, March 28, 1988: 1). In his view, China's top priority was to meet the global scientific competition. Since this was a problem of technical design, putting it first suggested that the nation should be run by engineers. Top Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang largely shared Qian's views. In some cases, news topics for the *Herald* were first mandated by high politicians. The paper reported, for example, that economists wrote essays on themes chosen by top leaders (January 10, 1983: 1). Essays by Huan Xiang, Ma Hong and Lu Jiaxi were closely related to Zhao Ziyang's speech on the challenge that China faced under the impact of the new technological revolution (August 19, 1985: 2). In the late 1970s, Deng

Xiaoping divulged that science and technology are "productive forces." Lu Yi, an editor of the *Herald*, wrote an article for the front page of the newspaper in 1989, announcing Deng's further insight that science and technology are "the most important productive forces."

These discussions about technology implied an historical necessity for technocratic leadership. In the early 1980s, the atmosphere did not allow intellectuals to make straightforward political demands. Leadership positions were then determined more by "redness" than by "expertise." Anti-intellectual Maoism, though somewhat losing its popularity, was still strong in China. The *Herald* thus had to make its political arguments skillfully, and domestic concerns were often aired as foreign news. In 1983, for example, the *Herald* published numerous essays about civil service systems in many countries. Topics included the Carter administration's 1978 civil service reform, the role of bureaucracy in Japan's economic surge, the *Fulton Report* on the British civil service, technocracy in France, the Council of Economic Experts of West Germany, problems of the *nomenklatura* in the Soviet Union, and so forth (December 12, 1983: 11; and January 3, 1983: 7). Two essays on the formation of political elites in the USA and USSR even claimed that scientists, including social scientists, had become dominant groups in both superpowers (May 2, 1983: 5; and November 5, 1984: 6). These articles accelerated China's technocratic orientation in the 1980s, because they claimed more political prestige for scientists.

By the mid-1980s, nothing was more relevant to China's political reform than changes in other socialist countries. The *Herald*'s coverage of the Hungarian shifts provided an example. Rezso Nyers, an economist who altered the name of the Hungarian communist party (after he became its chair), was repeatedly praised by the *Herald* as the "father of Hungarian reform." Nyers was interviewed no less than seven times (November 14, 1983: 5; November 21, 1983: 5; November 28, 1983: 1 and 5; December 5, 1983: 5; July 8, 1985: 1; July 22, 1985; and May 19, 1986: 4). His arguments for the urgency of political reform in communist countries followed vague pronouncements by Deng Xiaoping to the same affect, and these became a justification for Chinese reformers to pursue similar programs (November 10, 1986: 13). In 1986, Su Shaozhi, then director of the Research Institute on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, wrote his impressions on

a visit to Hungary (May 12, 1986: 3; June 2, 1986: 1). The objective of political reform in Hungary, he stressed, was democratization of the communist system. Socialist countries should establish a proper relationship between government and Party, so that the latter would not interfere too much in the affairs of the former. The new theoretical task was to break through Marxist doctrinairism. Su Shaozhi and journalists of the *Herald* clearly used the Hungarian case to make an argument about Chinese politics. Another article, published in early 1985, had described the Hungarian economic and political reforms as parallel. Su argued that economic reforms would make progress only if political reforms were also implemented; this position later became widely accepted by scholars and political elites (February 198, 1985: 10). But at that time, the *Herald* could make the argument only in an indirect way, by discussing Hungary.

The *Herald* also initiated a heated discussion on "global citizenship" (February 15, 1988; March 21, 1988: 3; and March 28, 1988: 14; Lu, 1989). The central concern was that China remained far behind many developed and other countries in economic strength. If this situation continued, according to both political leaders and scholars, the Chinese would lose their "global citizenship." Some authors argued that the survival of capitalism and the decline of socialism largely resulted from a difference in their institutions' emphases on technological progress (February 15, 1988: 1 and 15). The most important determinant of political power in the world, according to these writers, lay in scientific and technological development (February 15, 1988: 1).

As Table 7 shows, the domestic issues reported were diverse, but certain topics carried far more weight than others. Social welfare, environment, labor, and domestic trade were rare among domestic news items. Women, the elderly, urban housing, and other important issues received little attention. And, although reports of the welcome impact of the technological revolution were a consistent theme in the *Herald*'s news flow, any criticism of technocratic thinking was scarce in the newspaper and was relegated to back pages (March 6, 1989: 15; March 13, 1989: 15; and June 16, 1986: 5).

In international affairs, news on the USSR underwent a dramatic change in 1986, the first full year Gorbachev was General Secretary,

when negative reporting diminished and positive articles surged. This dramatic change in the *Herald*'s vision of the Soviet Union occurred three years earlier than the full re-normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989. The boldness of the *Herald*'s positive reporting on the Soviet Union and reforms in Eastern Europe sometimes strained the tolerance of the Chinese government, whose conservatives were even more concerned about examples of reform in socialist countries than about news from the capitalist world. Shanghai municipal authorities thus sent a work team to oversee the editorial affairs of the *Herald* in 1987. Yuan Jiangning, then the *Herald*'s Beijing bureau chief, was transferred back to Shanghai, because he wrote a story in which he greatly praised the Soviet reform program.[3]

In summary, these changes highlight three phenomena of post-Mao China. First, the *Herald* showed obvious biases for the interests of technocratic elites. Second, the *Herald* propagated new understandings of foreign countries such as the Soviet Union, even though these views were not uniformly held by all in government. Third, the *Herald* devoted increasing space to political and domestic topics, even though these remained sensitive areas.

CHINA'S TECHNOCRACY: GENERAL THEORIES AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

How does this case study of the *Herald* fit into the previous political science of technocracy? Why have technical elites sometimes split among themselves? A brief review of the literature on technocracy, and of the Chinese historical context for technocracy, will put these findings about the *Herald* in comparative perspective.

THEORIES OF TECHNOCRACY

The word "technocracy" was coined in the United States by William Henry Smyth (1933; 1932) after World War I, although the concept can be found earlier in the writings of prominent European thinkers such as Henri Comte de Saint-Simon (1952), Gaetano Mosca (1939), and Max Weber (1964 and 1978). All these scholars saw the

TABLE 7: Content Analysis of Domestic Articles in the *World Economic Herald* (Items)

Subject/Year	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*87*	*88*	*89*	*Total*	
Economic	42	271	393	558	701	780	857	794	628	109	5,133	73.6%
Economy (General)	17	81	40	130	40	68	111	27	52	10	576	8.2%
Economic Reform	3	9	7	9	82	62	54	145	117	34	522	7.4%
Price Reform				3	9	11	14	6	37	3	83	1.1%
Joint Companies		1	1	1	3	7	23	17	19	3	75	1.0%
Enterprise Reform		2	1	2	4	7		50	62	4	132	1.8%
Entrepreneurs		2	1	4	3	6	21	36	6		79	1.0%
Economic Law		7	9	34	17	35	22	20	11	1	156	2.2%
Foreigners' on PRC economy	11	9	23	24	25	55	46	56	61	14	324	4.6%
Special Economic Zones		6	12	20	34	15	26	28		2	143	2.0%
Regional Economy*		4	32	42	217	178	105	73	60	11	722	10.3%
Taiwan		5	10	3	6	11	11	11	20	3	80	1.1%
Hong Kong	3	19	27	11	25	17	9	15	10		136	1.9%
Industry		8	40	66	63	35	62	38	16	1	329	4.7%
Energy Source		4	58	28	9	4	14	15	4	5	141	2.0%
Agriculture		10	15	19	21	19	23	16	17	4	144	2.0%
Transportation/Communication		4	9	31	61	35	18	19	10		187	2.6%
Tourist Economy		12	22	22	19	29	55	49	36	1	245	3.5%
Urban Economy		3	9	16	7	8	28	6	13	1	91	1.3%
Environment			13	3	6	17	23	2	3		67	0.9%
Domestic Trade			11	19	3	10		8	4	1	56	0.8%
Finance/Banking	8	47	28	43	37	92	107	114	56	6	538	7.6%
Business Administration		38	14	19	8	59	85	42	14	1	280	4.0%

Population			4	2				1		1	7	0.1%
Labor			7	7	2						16	0.2%
Political					2	5	70	83	119	53	332	4.8%
Political Reform					2		61	42	82	40	227	3.3%
Law & Legal System						5	9	40	27	4	85	1.2%
Press freedom								1	10	9	20	0.3%
Social & Cultural		28	10	109	77	45	130	59	82	11	551	7.9%
Culture							49	7	26	1	83	1.2%
Education		28	6	28	11	31	30	8	15	6	163	2.3%
Talents/Intellectuals				38	20	8	10	5	13	3	87	1.2%
Science & Technology			4	53	46	3	38	37	26	1	208	2.9%
Social Problems & Welfare						3	3	2	2		10	0.1%
Foreign Relations/Trade	73	95	120	78	99	106	133	137	108	7	956	13.7%
Foreign Relations	20	29	35	20	27	48	10	19	42	4	254	3.6%
Foreign Trade	53	66	85	58	72	58	123	118	66	3	702	10.1%
Total	115	394	523	745	879	936	1,190	1,073	937	180	6,972	100%

*Outside Shanghai

world undergoing a fundamental elite transformation, largely caused by rapid technical development. Karl Marx also argued somewhat similar ideas long ago; but, by the middle of this century, other kinds of political scientists, economists, and sociologists such as James Burnham (1941), Jacques Ellul (1964), John Kenneth Galbraith (1969), Daniel Bell (1973), and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1970) focused scholarly attention on the institutional impact of changes in technology.

Although these recent scholars all saw an increasing role for technical elites, they disagreed on the value of this trend. Some viewed it as politically and economically beneficial, while others stressed its tension with democracy. Two common propositions in technocratic thinking are: 1) Modern problems, which sometimes originate from technological change, can only be reduced by the application of more advanced technology. 2) Government, which is supposed to handle all kinds of problems, should consist of experts—particularly scientists and engineers. According to some advocates of technocracy, society is now so complex that only experts can estimate the implications of a decision, therefore, technical expertise should become a prerequisite for leadership. On these assumptions, technocracy is defined as "a political system in which the determining influence belongs to technicians of the administration and of the economy" (Bell, 1973: 348). A technocrat is a trained professional with a leadership position.

If early writings on technocracy are based more on deductive premises than on empirical verification, recent studies of technocracy tend to gather data on the formation of elites. Although most scholars find that Western governments are not completely dominated by experts, they show that technocrats are active at all levels (Gilpin and Wright, 1964; Suleiman, 1974 and 1978; Gryski, 1981). In *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*, Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman wrote that "Western civil services have become increasingly specialized, highly professionalized, and unquestionably powerful—a cadre of experts in the running of the modern state" (1981: 3). In France especially, the idea of technocracy has been central to political studies; the Fifth Republic is sometimes called the "Republic of the Technocrats" (Ridley, 1966: 39).

Most writings characterize technocracy simply as a type of government. But if democracy can be seen as a socio-political movement, so

can technocracy. The word "technocracy" was adopted by a social movement in the United States in response to the Great Depression (Elsner, 1967; Akin, 1977). William Akin traced the origins of this trend in many engineers' search for an occupational identity, in Frederick Taylor's notion of scientific management, and in earlier ideas of Saint-Simon, Weber, and Veblen. Akin observed that U.S. engineers increased tenfold during the first four decades of this century and dramatically enhanced their social status (1977: 5). An anecdote in President Herbert Hoover's early career is often cited to illustrate this change: "When Herbert told a lady he was an engineer, she replied, 'Why, I thought you were a gentleman' " (Stabile, 1984: 29).

Almost all writings on the American technocratic movement describe it as a failure (Akin, 1977; Elsner, 1967; Faulkner, 1965). Yet none gives sufficient attention to the legacy of the movement in the West, the Far East, and the Third World. Contradictions abound in these evaluations. Akin, for example, concluded that the movement failed because the technocrats lacked a political theory of action. But he noted that James Burnham's widely read book *The Managerial Revolution*, published in 1941, pointed to a triumph of technocracy (Akin, 1977: 169). The major lacuna in these studies is a careful analysis of linkages among technocrats in government, the sociopolitical movement promoting them, and the technocratic ideology that justifies rule by experts. This last element is crucial. Ideology, as George Lodge and Ezra Vogel have defined it, is a framework of ideas to explicate values and legitimize institutions (1987), but it is often argued that technocracy is distinguished by an absence of ideological commitment (Bell, 1973 and 1960). In reality, it is rooted in a strongly meritocratic view of society. Technocrats claim that a scientific revolution rightly brings them to supreme power, because they can best serve the interests of modern society.

CHINA'S TRANSITION TO TECHNOCRACY

China's technocratic orientation in the post-Mao era has been studied before (Li and White, 1990; Lee, 1983). In the Central Committee of the CCP, the portion of scientists increased from 2.7% in 1977 to 20% by 1987 (Li and White, 1988: 380). A recent study of

Chinese mayors found that 78% in 1986 had received some college-level education—about 75% of these majoring in engineering or natural science (Li and Bachman, 1989: 71). This number is striking, if we compare it with the 2% of college-educated mayors and county heads in 1981 (Guangjiaojing, March 16, 1986: 21). Furthermore, among the mayors under 50 years of age, almost 100% by 1986 had received a college education. This is important, because the portion of college graduates in the 1986 labor force was only 0.8% (Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986: 89).

Such quick change relates both to China's long history and to its Maoist legacy. For more than 2,000 years, social stratification in China was generally based on Mencius's idea that those who labor with their minds rule, and those who labor with physical strength are ruled. Under this ideology, education served as the main ladder to success. To become a scholar-official was the highest goal for many (Ho, 1962: 92-99). Social mobility and elite recruitment in traditional China have been treated in several outstanding studies (Zhou, 1935; Wang, 1948; Fei, 1953; Chang, 1955; Marsh, 1961; Ho, 1962; Ch'ü, 1962). Not everyone who labored with his mind in traditional China was a member of the ruling elite; the term *pu yi* ("wearers of cotton-cloth garments") identified scholars who were not officials. Also, not all members of the ruling class were educated; rebellions repeatedly brought some illiterates to power. Nevertheless, the politicalization of intellectuals and the combination of "officialdom" with "scholardom" were two important characteristics of Chinese society (Du, 1989; Wang and Bo, 1989). What distinguishes past and present elites is that men who rose to official positions in traditional China were always generalists, not specialists—not technocrats in a modern sense. As Ping-ti Ho stressed, "success in trade, industry, finance, science, and technology, which has for centuries been socially esteemed in the West, was viewed in traditional China as a secondary achievement" (1962: 259). It is new to see so many technical experts in high positions in Chinese politics.

The more recent political legacy of Maoism also highlights the novelty of technocracy in China. The Chinese Communist Party rose to power as a military organization; its leaders were mostly soldiers, peasants, and members of the urban lower-middle class (Scalapino,

1972; Kau, 1971). Although many leading communists went abroad in the 1920s, they were mainly engaged in political activities rather than formal education. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, a large number of peasants, many illiterate, flocked into the Red Army and the Party. Some of these people, two decades later, became major figures in the ruling of the People's Republic of China. The formation of Chinese communist elites thus helps to explain a recurring conflict between "reds" and "experts" in frequent anti-intellectual campaigns. Schurmann (1968: 8) noted the beginnings of a new elite of educated professionals. But by the 1960s, one of the most important Chinese accusations against "revisionism," in the USSR and domestically, was its technocratic orientation.

A fundamental change of political elites requires symbols, banners, slogans, and movements. Technocrats do not emerge suddenly, without any political effort. Nor do they attain power simply because an abstract "technological imperative" calls for their leadership. They fight for legitimate power, using media and other tools. In Taiwan, for example, such demands were strongly articulated in late 1960s and early 1970s by the academic journal *Daxue zazhi* (The Intellectual, as the journal translated its own title) (Huang, 1976; Nan, 1979; Li and White, 1990). *Daxue zazhi* emphasized the experts' central role in modernization—and their right to participate in politics. In this journal, the term "technocrat" (*jishu guanliao*) was for the first time seriously examined in Chinese (v. 1. no. 5: 10-13; v. 5, no. 5: 3-4; and *Xia chao*, v. 1, no. 8: 24). Some Taiwanese authors said the "politics of contemporary society should be characterized by technocracy." One wrote, "Our society needs technocrats, who really understand current problems, to take part in the policy-making process and carry out these policies. This is one of the major aspects of reform" (v. 8, no. 48: 37). *Daxue zazhi*, like the *Herald*, its mainland counterpart sixteen years later, was shut down by the authorities. But in Taiwan also, technical experts have continued to find their ways into government.

The *Herald* case suggests that intellectuals were not passively called to power by a technological revolution; rather, they actively demanded political change. Massive elite transformation in the 1980s was bolstered by claims about technological revolution. These two parallel developments can be understood together as a coherent tech-

nocratic movement – one that achieved major political objectives. As Lynn Miller (1985) has observed, the articulation of new social values is often an attempt to legitimize the quest for power. Conversely, the will to power in a new elite is accompanied by the articulation of new values. For politically active technical intellectuals, the *Herald* was not just a public institution, it was also the mouthpiece of their claim to rule.

This same issue has been prominent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By the 1960s, some scholars of socialist countries argued that under the impact of industrialization, a new managerial-technocratic class primarily composed of intellectuals would emerge. This was a "new class" – but different from Milovan Dijilas's "New Class" which was mainly composed of party cadres (Djilas, 1957; Beck, 1963). Two Hungarian scholars, Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, have highlighted this argument (Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979). Reviewing the evolution of the Soviet political system, they maintained that the fundamental conflict in socialist society was not between educated people and party bureaucrats, nor between "free intellectuals" (scholars, artists, and teachers) and technocrats, but between the working class and a new intelligentsia. But this view has been criticized by many other writers, arguing that intellectuals in the Soviet system have not been "on the road to class power," but instead have been on a "road of dissent" (Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorski, 1989).

In the West, intellectuals and power are sometimes considered "incompatible" (Barrow, 1987). Alvin Gouldner (1979) distinguished "humanistic" from "technical" intellectuals. But "scholardom" and "officialdom" have closely combined in countries such as China. PRC state allocations of university places to engineering and the sciences have been much heavier than to humanities; thus, many broadly skillful young people major in sciences. Some have not hesitated to become "critical intellectuals," especially because their technical expertise may justify their claims to power. In several East European countries, as Szelenyi says, the "most articulate segment of the intellectuals had a love affair with power" (1987). In the Soviet Union, Kendall Bailes observes that after Stalin's death, Soviet technical experts emerged as the "single largest element from which the ruling elite has been recruited."[4] As Eva Etzioni-Halevy (1985: 14) argued,

intellectuals do not emerge as a roughly homogeneous class, but rather "as a series of hierarchies that stretch from almost the top of the power structure to nearly its bottom." If her view is right, intellectuals are diversified; some are on the road to power, while others are on roads of dissent or eremitism.

Zheng Yefu, a Chinese scholar who has written extensively on intellectuals in the *Herald* and elsewhere, categorizes five types: 1) those who completely identify with the regime, 2) those who start their careers as independent scholars but later become power elites, 3) those who consistently communicate with the government but do not lose their role as social critics, 4) those who are indifferent to politics, and 5) those who always fight against the regime (January 25, 1988: 5; September 12, 1988: 13; and May 9, 1988: 15). In our study of the diversification of Chinese intellectuals, we find that, although a small number of intellectuals have benefited from the reform financially (through visits abroad, second jobs, or political privileges), the majority of intellectuals have suffered economically from reform (White with Li, 1988). In post-Mao China, many technical intellectuals have nonetheless come to power. Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi, Wen Yuankai and many other leading dissidents today were part of the elite establishment in the middle-1980s, or even in early 1989. They are now shadow technocrats. Along what fissures did the intellectual elite, which the *Herald* represented in the mid-1980s, split so severely by 1989?

CONFLICTS AMONG TECHNOCRATS: THREE VARIABLES

Three causes – generation gaps, ideological conflict, and factional struggle – help explain the confrontation among technocrats.

Generation gaps. The *Herald* changed its personnel significantly over time. The older generation of editors and advisors retired or became less active in the final years of the newspaper, as a younger generation gradually became its core group. Compared with their predecessors, these young people were less well-known and had scant official status. It is understandable that they were less satisfied with the status quo. This generation gap between intellectuals, partly caused by the Cultural Revolution, was an important variable for confrontation among them. The difference was extended by the tremendous split

between old and young intellectuals in terms of political associations, social statuses, and financial situations—but this variable was more relevant to intellectuals associated with the *Herald* than to Chinese educated people in general. Actually, all levels of formal leadership have been occupied by young college-educated elites in recent years. In the *Herald*, bold ideas and straightforward criticism of the government also came from some old intellectuals; Editor Qin Benli was probably the best example of this.

Ideological conflict. Early 1989 was an exciting time for Chinese journalists, particularly for those at the *Herald*. They appealed for a democratic society, demanded freedom of the press, held symposia, delivered speeches, signed petitions, and even organized demonstrations. For a while, it seemed that the democratic idealism that has inspired many generations since the May Fourth Movement might finally be fulfilled. But modern Chinese history has repeatedly suggested that Chinese intellectuals tend to be more interested in democratic "noises" rather than democratic "values" (to use the words of Friedrich Nietzsche) (Schwarcz, 1989: 120). The social values disseminated in the *Herald* during most of the 1980s were mainly technocratic, and some were explicitly undemocratic. This journal's sobriquet as "forerunner of the Chinese democratic movement" was somewhat ironic. The *Herald* introduced some Western democratic ideas to Chinese readers, but this effort was less systematic than its introduction of Western technocratic ideas. Even in 1989, the newspaper often advocated technical elitism and "new authoritarianism" (*xin quanweizhuyi*).[5] In 1989 *Herald* articles, scholars at the Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute (one of Zhao Ziyang's major think tanks), openly criticized checks and balances, multi-party systems, and direct elections. In these authors' view, what China needed was "elite politics" (*jingying zhengzhi*), rather than "democratic politics" (*minzhu zhengzhi*). They believed China's poor economic and educational conditions should disallow majority rule or representative government. The best course for China was to recruit "knowledge elites" (*zhishi jingying*) into the circle of the "power elite" (*quanli jingying*). Such a combination of knowledge and power would, they claimed, accelerate modernization (January 30, 1989: 10).

On May 1, 1989, shortly before being closed by Shanghai authorities, the *Herald* published a full-page article entitled "China's Modernization and the Ideological Trend of Populism." This essay argued against populism, which, despite some positive effects, was deemed incompatible with industrial society and often an obstacle to modernization. The Cultural Revolution was seen as a result of populism.[6] Talented people have always been overwhelmed by large masses. So this essay's authors straightforwardly advocated elitism (*jingying jingshen*); the priority for China was to propagate elitist views and values (May 1, 1989: 7). Their argument echoed Fang Lizhi's finding, after he visited Italy in 1986, when he said that intellectuals are *the* primary social progressive force in the contemporary world (November 24, 1986: 3). Tocqueville would have been charmed.

The content analysis above has shown that writers in the *Herald* talked very little about non-elite social groups. As Richard Kraus has observed, when intellectuals mention other groups it is usually to complain that "peasants and the new petty bourgeoisie (*getihu*) have become much richer than professors and artists. Few intellectuals seem very concerned with such issues as worker safety, child labor, or discrimination against women in the workforce" (Kraus, 1990). An emphasis on these topics, and on the current welfare of workers and peasants, would have been made by a less self-regarding elite that might have felt the need for really democratic legitimation such as only large social groups can give. The knowledge elite's sense of self-importance can be best illustrated by the headline of the *Herald*'s lead article on February 20, 1989: "To Gain Intellectuals is to Gain Everything, and to Lose Intellectuals is to Lose Everything."[7]

Most Chinese political leaders, both officials and dissidents, have shared this technocratic ideology. Liu Ji, head of the work team sent by Jiang Zemin to "reorganize" the *Herald* in April 1989, was a scholar who had frequently contributed to the newspaper. His collaborative essay with Tong Daling, entitled "On Economic Leadership," emphasized the value of "think tanks" in making policy (October 17, 1983: 3). Liu has also written extensively on the coming of the "third wave" and the "Fourth Industrial Revolution" (November 7, 1983: 1). Li Tieying, a 1990 Politburo member, often wrote for and was interviewed by the

Herald. In an article of "Ideas on Establishing Strategic Thinking in China's Technological Development," Li claimed plainly that China cannot achieve its objectives without a technocratic leadership, but also that an atmosphere of academic freedom might promote knowledge and young talent (August 27, 1984: 6). This last point suggested that some pluralism was compatible with technocracy—but only a pluralism to mobilize scientific elites, not a democratic devolution of rights to ordinary people.

The dominant values of the *Herald* were technocratic and elitist, and ideological conflict along this dimension was not a major source of splits between intellectuals. The confrontation between government technocrats such as Li Tieying and Liu Ji and shadow technocrats such as Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi is not a result of long-standing ideological conflict about the political roles of masses and elites, or even about what kind of elite should rule. These leaders have disagreed with each other on many issues, but they have all linked legitimate power to scientific knowledge.

These consistent technocratic values do not mean that writers for the *Herald* were similar to each other on all political issues (or that they cannot change their minds in the future). On the contrary, such leaders have differed significantly about the timing, objectives, and content of many economic and political reforms. Dissident intellectuals associated with the *Herald*, who were arrested or exiled after June Fourth, had contrasting perspectives on many important matters. Since early 1988, for example, the *Herald* was flooded with essays on ownership reform. On April 3, 1989, the paper published a detailed report about a symposium on "The Crisis of the State-Ownership System." According to Zhang Weiguo, the author, many Chinese economists believed the state economic system was at a dead end world-wide (April 3, 1989: 10). In another symposium report, entitled "Privatization Is An Effective Means To Eliminate Poverty," Zhang argued that "it was the public ownership system (*gongyouzhi*) that corrupted officials, society, and our whole nation" (May 1, 1989: 15). In February 1989, the *Herald* published an open letter to top leaders of the Chinese government written by eleven Chinese scholars at Stanford University. The authors argued that China's reforms would fail unless the ownership system were changed (February 27, 1989).

Some academics even suggested that an ownership transformation in China could be achieved within three or four years (February 20, 1989: 13). But other writers strongly opposed this "ownership system imperative" (*zhidu jueding lun*). Xiao Gongqing, for example, argued in a 1989 *Herald* essay that such a view, which emphasized a deterministic need to transform public ownership into private, was "political romanticism" in the Chinese context (March 13, 1989: 11). In Xiao's view, this proposal was a new kind of "great leap forward." It could cause, rather than solve, economic and political problems. The Maoist economic system might come back, if ownership reform were pressed too fast. Another scholar argued that what privatization would bring to the Chinese people "might not be wealth and prosperity, but bureaucratic capitalism, the most decadent and moribund system" (March 27, 1989: 14, 15).

While a few dissident intellectuals associated with the *Herald* called for more mass participation, most argued that a more restrictive and representative "socialist congress democracy" (*shehuizhuyi yihui minzhu*) would be the "safe way" for China's political reform. Cao Siyuan, director of the Social Development Research Institute affiliated with Beijing's private Stone Company, in November 1988 published a series articles on the "road towards socialist congress democracy" (November 7, 1988: 13; November 21, 1988: 11; and November 28, 1988: 7). He argued that democratic training should be conducted in people's congresses, rather than in the streets. He claimed that socialist congress democracy would prevent both a rebellion by the people and a crackdown by the government. Cao's concern became an ironic tragedy. He was arrested after June Fourth—because of his activities to call a special meeting of the People's Congress during the crises of 1989.

The evidence shows that government technocrats and dissident intellectuals have shared elitist political views, even though they faced different political fates after June Fourth. Generation gaps and some ideological differences surely exist among China's technocrats, but they cannot fully account for 1989. These observations suggest the need to search for a third variable to explain the confrontation among China's technical elites.

Factional struggle. The *Herald* was often closer to top Party and government leaders than were other newspapers. The paper's associ-

ation with Zhao Ziyang and his think tanks was evident after mid-1988 especially. In June of that year, Bao Tong, Zhao's secretary in the Politburo, sent a message to the *Herald* requiring its journalists to study the "new order of the socialist commodity economy."[8] It was unusual for the Party head's secretary to give a mandate to one specialized newspaper, instead of using the official organ (*Renmin ribao*) or sending it to all major newspapers in the country. According to Bao, the "new order of the socialist commodity economy" required that all political institutions, administrative regulations, and social values in Chinese society should be suited to commodity trading. In a *Herald* column on June 17, 1988, Bao emphasized the need to coordinate economic reforms with political reforms.

Bao's conduct should be understood within the broader environment of 1988. Zhao's bold economic program had run into serious problems, including failures of planned deliveries, state budget deficits, growing economic gaps between the south coast and other areas, drastically increased inflation, and rampant official corruption. In his government work report at the National People's Congress held in March 1988, Li Peng implied that Zhao's reform was out of control, and Li called for macro-economic readjustment.[9] The *Herald*'s journalists were not allowed to attend the conference or interview deputies, but they certainly understood the implications of Li's speech. In late 1988 and early 1989, the *Herald* published many articles and news reports to rebut Li's charges. Members of Zhao's think tanks, including Chen Yizi, Wang Xiaoqiang, Wen Yuankai, and Yan Jiaqi, wrote to or were interviewed by the *Herald*. By January 23, 1989, for example, the first-page headline story was an interview entitled "There Were No Major Mistakes in the Ten Years of Reform."

Yan Jiaqi and Su Shaozhi wrote that problems such as inflation were not serious. As they suggested, many other countries had undergone such difficulties during economic development (January 9, 1989: 15). Wen Yuankai compared Mrs. Thatcher's reforms to Zhao's. According to Wen, when Mrs. Thatcher started changing technology policy in England, about 200 economists and 500 scientists wrote a joint letter to the *Times* criticizing the reform program. But Mrs. Thatcher ignored their criticism and eventually achieved her objectives (January 9, 1989: 15). Wen sounded uncharacteristically more like a politician

than an intellectual, when he approved of her neglect of scientists. But, at the end of 1988, the *Herald* published Zhang Weiguo's interview of Wen Yuankai and Yan Jiaqi. Wen and Yan warned that "some people" were waiting for chaos to break out in the reforms, so that they might completely take power (December 19, 1988: 14). Although they did not indicate to whom they referred, Li Peng was implied. They predicted accurately.

Dissident intellectuals became much bolder in criticizing Li Peng and other conservatives during early 1989. On April 3, the lead *Herald* article began with a question asked by a foreign journalist: "How should one explain the different emphases in the Chinese leadership on the reform – Zhao's policy of deepening reform or Li's policy of readjustment?" In the same issue, Hu Jiwei, former editor of the *Renmin ribao* and standing member of the National People's Congress who wrote regularly for the *Herald*, criticized Li Peng for his "serious mistakes in overlooking the importance and urgency of political reform." Although the elderly Hu was not arrested after June Fourth, he was subjected to "serious investigation."

After the Tiananmen tragedy, many well-known intellectuals and members of Zhao's think tanks escaped from China. They had previously called for gradual reforms; but now, learning from their experiences, many thought of themselves as "revolutionaries" (Lao, 1990: 98; Schwarcz, 1989: 122). Yan Jiaqi argued in April 1989 that the "majority of talented people in China are in the Chinese Communist Party" (April 3, 1989: 11). But by late 1989, Yan said the regime had become the most anti-intellectual one in modern Chinese history (Shijie ribao, July 5, 1989: 7; and Zheng ming, October 1989: 26). Chen Yizi claimed in early 1989 that there had been "no major mistakes" in China's ten years of reform; but after he escaped to the United States, he admitted that China's economy had been faced with severe problems (Shibao zhoukan, 1990: 46-48, 74-76). Some recanted their earlier enthusiasm for "neo-authoritarianism." Meanwhile, conservative technocrats who had been closely associated with the *Herald*, such as Qian Xuesen and Li Tieying, labelled others like Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi as "counter-revolutionaries" and "traitors." Although generation gaps, ideological debates, and factional splits were all relevant to this conflict among elitists, the factional variable

became most useful in explaining the fate of various technocrats, at least because it summarized the rest.

The fact that differences among technocrats appeared in 1989 should not, however, obscure the extent of their previous similarity. The dissidents, looking at the hardliners, may, like Mrs. Malaprop, be sorry they "resemble that remark," or at least once did so. Of course, not all technocrats are the same; but they are all incomplete as democrats. Some may have later called for structural changes in Chinese political procedures, but democratic constitution-writers have been noticeable by their scarcity. The main dissident demands have thus far been for new incumbents, not new structures. It is unnecessary to distinguish reform intellectuals' views from all possible constructions of democracy, in order to show that many Chinese who have knowledge still think that learning implies a right to rule.

TECHNOCRATIC CONFLICTS AND DEMOCRATIC POSSIBILITIES

The technocratic movement, of which the *World Economic Herald* was once the most obvious institutional representative, is still dominant in China. Divisions between educated elites are likely to persist there, as conservative and reformist leaders continue to seek supporters. This process will lead to further uneven political development in China, but it may eventually help institutionalize participation by wider groups. Because China's leaders know their country needs economic progress, ambitious people with technical expertise will continue to have an opportunity to claim power. Technocrats of many diverse sorts, by the 1990s, have already become the central actors in Chinese politics. They are not the first such elite. Before their prominence, modern China was led by conflicting late Qing imperial bureaucrats, nationalist reformers, liberals, warlords, and communists. Technocrats now win conflicts over policy and power regularly, but they are divided among themselves. Government technocrats and would-be technocrats alike speak of stability, planning, and democracy, as if politics can somehow achieve a state of nirvana, rather than as if politics will always remain a field of conflict. The role of science in many countries has been to offer diverse options for political choice;

but, in contemporary China, science is supposed to imply uniquely correct choices (Pye, 1990: 62).

Perhaps the main question is whether political strife in China will soon create institutions under which large social groups can nonetheless benefit. Technocracy has inherent limitations. To solve many dilemmas of human values, apparently no master science exists. The most prominent scientist of this century, Albert Einstein, "was once asked why, if he could solve the secrets of the universe, he could not devise a plan for the prevention of war. His answer was that politics was more complicated than the rules of physics" (Forman, 1980: ix). Technocracy cannot, despite the faith its adherents' invest in science, solve all kinds of human problems. The conclusion is not just that technocratic elitism, based on expertise, has anti-democratic aspects because majorities lack specific scientific knowledge. A more important conclusion is more positive, about alternatives to technocracy and the sequel to it: Democracy may grow not mainly from philosophical adherence to democratic values, but from the practical experiences of elites who come to recognize the limits of what they can do. Political conflict, while eroding technocratic legitimacy, in some cases leads to democratic practice.

Government and dissident technocrats, for all their prestige and intelligence, are also famed in China for their arrogance. If technocrats suggest that respect for their own authority is historically necessary for the nation's strength – and, in the *Herald*, they very often wrote this – they may neglect non-intellectuals who have political resources. When technocrats begin to fight each other, as they did in 1989, they must mobilize non-elites in their efforts to win. Over time, this experience can modify their snobbishness and begin to replace the strong values of hierarchy that still dominate both governmental and dissident politics in China. During this process, some technocratic elites may lessen their elitism and lose the social hubris that clearly afflicts many Chinese intellectuals, both those in government and those in dissent. That kind of struggle, pluralization, and resource-seeking is a standard hallmark of democratic and proto-democratic evolution, even though none of its participants may begin as fully liberal, and even though democracy in different nations has assumed very different forms.

E. E. Schattschneider, writing about the United States, has urged a distinction

> between what amateurs know and what professionals know. The problem is not how 180 million Aristotles can run a democracy, but how we can organize a political community of 180 million ordinary people so that it remains sensitive to their needs. . . . The people are involved in public affairs by the conflict system [1975: 135].

Competing elites try to recruit resources against their rivals. This has happened in many cultural settings; and relativism in judging political developments may be avoidable, to the extent that this pattern is actually shared. In China, conflicting technocratic factions, despite their common elitism, may slowly broaden their interests, shed some hauteur, and thus become more effective in garnering support from workers, peasants, soldiers, managers, and rural entrepreneurs. The technocrats who do this stand a greater chance of long-term political success than the technical elites who do not.

At Tiananmen in 1989, there was more enthusiasm for "democracy" than clear definition of it. Many reported broad feelings of community trust on the Square, but many of the top student leaders notoriously could not stand each other. Their affection for non-intellectuals was effusive, but it was seldom translated into specific calls for broad electoral procedures. Constitution-makers were noticeably scarce in 1989 Beijing.[10] The political demands from Tiananmen were generally substantive, not structural. They were often presented in emotional words and through traditional petitions, not through means to assure more permanent benefits from government decisions for non-elites. The interactions among the government's conservatives were less public, but extensions of tolerance may have been no more common in those circles. Li Peng is certainly different from Fang Lizhi, but neither is famous for modesty nor for having the common touch.

Beijing students and residents put themselves in mortal danger for the sake of a democracy they could not define, but this is no reason to condemn them. Perhaps the best definition of democracy is directional and evolutionary. (Thomas Jefferson, for example, remains a credible democrat although he owned slaves). A *sans-culotte* storming the Bastille, or a minuteman at Concord Bridge, could hardly have offered a satisfactory theory of democracy—yet they acted well enough for

this end. Memories of violence, rather than coherent philosophies, have often made new politics decisively. China's conflicts of the 1980s, including Tiananmen, could later prove to have fostered democracy of a Chinese sort (no more similar to the American, Italian, Indian, or Japanese types than those are like each other). The critical intellectuals who eventually return from Chinese prisons or exile could prove to be better democrats than the same people who were forced to go there as deposed technocrats. The 1989 fissure among China's elites will not be the last. If so, further political development in that country could prove broadly like what has happened elsewhere.

Important social groups—notably rural industrialists, who are now transforming China's economy and fiscal system—were absent from either side at Tiananmen. Students there were able, at least after martial law was declared, to make warm connections with many kinds of Beijing residents. Some in the city were martyred; they furthered the chance for democracy, not just as a fad or a shadow, because they explored the possibilities for links among elites and mass groups in a way that has preceded such evolution elsewhere. The main concern of conservative technocrats, also, lay in an attempt to engineer support among soldiers and workers. Chinese elites of many sorts will continue their efforts to make liaisons with other social groups, especially in their times of greatest need. This process is likely to alter their elitism only slowly. The rationalist modernizers' main claim to power in China is still based on expertise. The *World Economic Herald* served these diverse technocrats in the 1980s well. When fighting between regime and dissident intellectuals breaks out again, the media will continue to be a central battleground.

NOTES

1. Other newspapers such as Science and Technology (*Keji bao*), and even Party papers, also carried many articles with technocratic content in the 1980s. None developed such fame or prestige as the *Herald*, however.

2. The regional-Shanghai section also includes local news from other provinces.

3. This information is based on an interview with an associate of the *Herald*. Also see Xin (1989). For Yuan's report on the Soviet Union and other East European countries, see the *Herald*, (July 6, 1987: 1).

4. See Bailes (1978: 3). For a further discussion of technocracy in the Soviet Union, see Rowney (1989), Beissinger (1988), and Hoffmann and Laird (1985).

5. The definition of "new authoritarianism" is not clear, even among writers on the subject. For Chinese authors, the main idea comes from Samuel Huntington. The concept was popularized by graduate students and young scholars notably Wu Jiaxiang, in Beijing and Shanghai during the late 1980s. Based on his assumption that the first guardian of modernization and democratization in England was the king, Wu believed there must a period of "flirting" between autocracy and freedom prior to the "marriage" of democracy and freedom. New authoritarianism is novel because it differs from old authoritarianism, which establishes power entirely through depriving individuals of freedom. Wu argued that state centralization and individual freedom are the two parallel developments most favorable to democracy. This individual freedom is reflected mainly in economic life, through a free market. China should thus pursue political centralization and economic decentralization, because a decline of government legitimacy may lead to anarchy. In this view, new authoritarianism can control problems such as official corruption, inflation, and localism. For more on "new authoritarianism," see the *Herald* (January 16, 1989: 12; February 6, 1989: 14; March 13, 1989: 10; March 20, 1989: 13; April 10, 1989: 12; and April 17, 1989: 15).

6. For an opposite view, that it was an unintended result of the official elite's organizational policies, see White (1989b).

7. "De zhishifenzi de tianxia, shi zhishifenzi shi tianxia," the *Herald*, February 20, 1989: 1.

8. Based on an interview with a scholar who was closely associated with the *Herald*. Also see the *Herald* (June 27, 1988: 1).

9. For a further discussion on Li's speech, see "Chao Tzu-yang – The Target of Li P'eng's Government Work Report," *Issues and Studies* 1989, 25: 1-4.

10. Nonetheless, CCP thinker Liao Gailong had espoused structural ideas about checks-and-balances in the early 1980s, Cao Siyuan did so later, and press freedom stirred some discussion of laws. See Liao (1986) and WuDunn, (1990: 32).

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