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This is my third attempt to produce a contribution to *Modern China*'s "Symposium on Mao and Marx." The first hasty reaction to Pfeffer's (1976) onslaught which I submitted in late May, in response to an invitation received in early April, was not published because it reached Los Angeles too long after the deadline. Meanwhile, Pfeffer had introduced important substantive changes into his article, as compared to the version on which my original comment was based. During the summer, I undertook to revise this reply, but finally gave it up as a bad job because I could not find in Pfeffer's piece enough substance to justify the serious discussion of the issues which I felt readers deserved. At this juncture, the Walder (1977) article arrived most opportunely to broaden the terms of the debate. Although it increases the sheer volume of attacks (nearly 35,000 words) to which I am asked by the editor to reply in 5,000 words, it does at least provide something you can get your teeth into. Let me now endeavour to do so.

Since the whole affair started with Pfeffer, it is with Pfeffer that I must begin. He presents his article as an effort to rid himself of the insidious influence which my writings, and those of two other representatives of "the field," have hitherto exercised on his ideological development. For someone who attaches so much importance to the autonomy of the superstructure, Pfeffer puts forward a curiously mechanical vision of progress in Western

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studies of Mao's thought, unfolding in the "chronological progression from Schwartz to Schram to Meisner." The order of the last two of this unholy trinity is in fact purely arbitrary, for Meisner's study of Li Da-zhao and my book on Mao's thought were originally written in the same year, 1962. I have no objection to this slight twisting of the facts in order to serve Pfeffer's theory, but I do most emphatically repudiate the notion that my interpretation of Chinese ideology crystallized once and for all in 1969, and that I have never subsequently had any doubts as to the adequacy of what I wrote then.

The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung [*Mao Ze-dong*] was first published at a time (1963) when the perspective in which the Chinese revolution presented itself to all of us was fundamentally different from what it is today. Mao and his comrades had been governing China for only a little more than a decade, and their major theoretical and practical achievement was therefore naturally seen to reside in devising a pattern for the conquest of power by armed struggle in the countryside. It is true that the first great experiment in the search for an independent Chinese road to socialism had already taken place, in the shape of the Great Leap Forward, but, as Pfeffer himself implies, it was not totally successful. By 1968, when I prepared the revised edition of this book (Schram, 1969), which serves as one of Pfeffer's two sources for my views, somewhat more was known about Mao's economic ideas, but this dimension of things was overshadowed by the extraordinary innovations, both practical and theoretical, of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, though the changes in the book were very extensive, I did not redress the balance of the first edition between the pre- and post-1949 periods, or give much consideration to Mao's thought as a "revolutionary development strategy."

In this one respect, Pfeffer's criticism of my approach is justified—or would be, if he did not know very well that I have subsequently published several pieces which deal at some length precisely with this theme: an article on the theory of the "permanent revolution" (Schram, 1971); the introduction to *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China* (Schram, 1973); and the introduction and notes to *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed* (Schram, 1974). I would not suggest that these items, individually

or collectively, constitute a major contribution to the subject, but it does seem odd that Pfeffer should not even mention them, in what purports to be a systematic survey of the evolving orthodoxy in "the field."[1] It is not nearly so odd, however, as the fact that he has not read Chairman Mao's writings of the 1950s and 1960s either, apart from those few texts officially released, and/or is not sure they are of any interest or significance. In note 15, tacked on as though by afterthought at the end of his piece, Pfeffer (1976: 458) remarks that it "remains to be seen" whether or not the availability of the two volumes reprinted in Taibei in 1973 will affect significantly the "pattern" of American interpretations of Mao's thought and its relation to Marxism.

This is, to put it mildly, an extraordinary statement. Pfeffer might have questioned the authenticity of these materials, though in my opinion he was well advised not to. (The spectrum of those who have made use of them extends from Guomindang and "bourgeois" scholars to the left and far left, and includes not only Levy but Gittings (1974), Nee and Peck (1975), and members of the Manifesto group in Italy, who have recently been joined by Walder. Moreover, those "leading Chinese Maoists" Yao Wen-yuan and Zhang Chun-qiao, in the articles of 1975 to which Pfeffer attaches so much importance, quoted at length from speeches reprinted on Taiwan, which turned out to be word-for-word identical with the exception of two or three characters.)

Pfeffer might also have queried the propriety of making use of publications of Mao's speeches not officially sanctioned by the Chairman, as has one noted critic of my work, but he chose not to put forward that argument either. (He might, indeed, have found it awkward to do so, while using as legitimate sources for Marx's views one text—the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844—which Marx deliberately chose not to publish, and another—*The German Ideology*—which, although it was originally scheduled for publication, Marx subsequently declared himself happy to consign to the "gnawing criticism of the mice.") And yet, having refrained from raising either of these objections, Pfeffer states baldly that he is not sure the newly available materials add anything to our understanding of Mao's thought.

It is clear, in any case, that they have contributed nothing to *his* interpretation of Mao's ideas, though they contain hundreds

of pages bearing directly on the problem of a development strategy, including Mao's comments on the Soviet manual of political economy. They also contain illuminating discussions of issues such as the role of the party and of the working class, and the problem of democratic centralism, which are crucial to any assessment of the relation between Mao's thought and Marxism-Leninism. In fact, if I now see (as I shall explain below) Mao Ze-dong as closer to the mainstream of the Leninist tradition than I did in 1969, this is very largely the result of reading and reflecting on a wide selection of his utterances of the 1950s and 1960s, including not only the two volumes reprinted in 1973, but also those translated several years ago by the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong (1969) and by Ch'en (1970). I venture to suggest that Pfeffer, too, could learn from these materials.

More singular still than Pfeffer's failure to make use of these unofficial collections of Mao's writings (which, after all, do raise some problems of accuracy, if not of authenticity) is his lack of interest in Marx's own writings on the dynamics of Asian societies. None of these are so much as mentioned in Part II of Pfeffer's piece; indeed, to read them would appear to go against his principles. Instead he proposes a remarkable methodology which consists in asking himself "what would a revolutionary Marxist—say Marx himself—have thought and done in China" at various crucial moments. The aforementioned critic of my writings has advised people not to be led astray by Schram's interpretation of Mao's thought, which was largely made up out of his own head. In setting himself up as the man who not only can read Marx's mind, but also can imagine what Marx would have thought if he had been reborn decades after his death in a wholly different society, Pfeffer has left me far behind, and has disappeared quite out of sight in cloud-cuckoo-land.

Apart from the sheer audacity of this technique for "the resolution of the issue of Mao's relation to Marx," there is an ambiguity about Pfeffer's formulation of which he does not seem to be aware. When he asks himself what "Marx" would have done in China in 1949, or in 1956, does he mean the real Marx, somehow plucked up from the British Museum and reincarnated in twentieth-century China, with his mind still shaped by his European upbringing and experience? Or does he mean someone

similar to Marx in character and intellect, but born in China and steeped, like Mao, in Chinese culture? The clear implication of Pfeffer's piece is that it does not make any difference. Summarizing my explanation of the genesis of Mao's thought, he says that I argue "that it was molded by elements of Mao's youthful personality, by conditions in China, and by Mao's revolutionary experience." He makes no mention, even in his discussion of my interpretation and still less in putting forward his own, of the problem of the relation between Mao's ideas and Chinese culture. No doubt, like Cohen, he regards this as a "hoary issue"—or perhaps a red herring.

To the extent that the sentence which Pfeffer added to note 15 (itself an afterthought) at the last moment signifies anything at all, save as a further expression of his compulsive urge to stick out his tongue at me on every possible occasion, it presumably refers to this dimension of my analysis. Because in my introduction to *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed* I have ventured to evoke once gain the problem of traditional influences on the structure of Mao's dialectics, I am not, in Pfeffer's view, treating Mao as a "pure" Marxist, and therefore I am not taking him seriously.

Unfortunately, Mao Ze-dong himself did not share Pfeffer's rigid view of these matters. It is true that from the 1950s onward, Mao abandoned the slogan of the "Sinification of Marxism," which he had put forward during the Yan-an period—no doubt because it suggested that his thought was marked by a certain parochialism, and had in fact been used, beginning in 1960, by pro-Soviet elements in the world communist movement to attack the Chinese along these lines. This did not mean, however, that he had ceased to be concerned with the problem of forging a synthesis between Marxism and other progressive ideas from the West, and those elements in China's heritage which are still of value today. One of the most striking statements on this question is Mao's "Talk to the Music Workers" (Schram, 1974: 84-90), but the problem of coming to terms with the traditional culture is present throughout Mao's writings, officially published or not, from the earliest days down to the end of his life. If Pfeffer imagines that Mao's thought and its historical role can be adequately understood *simply* as a development strategy,

without taking account of this dimension, he is very much out of tune with Mao's own perception of the problem.

This much being said, I agree with Pfeffer that there is no reason, simply because conditions in China in 1949 were very different from those in nineteenth-century Europe, not to look at Marx's discussion of the issues raised by the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to socialism and to see what light they throw on the problems faced by China today. Alas, the substance of his contribution here consists largely in tilting at windmills. "Would Marx," he asks, "have pressed [in 1949] for capitalist industrialization, in the dogmatic belief that only thus could a sufficiently large and alienated proletariat be developed to fuel a true socialist revolution to follow?" Ideas such as these were put forward long ago by the Russian "Economists," but has it ever been suggested by any of the new tricephalous entity Schwartz-Schram-Meisner that this is what Mao should have done in 1949? If not, what is the point of this sentence, and of pages like it? Has any Marxist of the Leninist persuasion ever imagined that institutional transformations "would be produced mechanically in the inevitable working out of contradictions between the forces of production and the relations of production," or that the party should play a "passive" role in the revolutionary process? If not, how could the said entity (all three constituents of which have read both Marx and Lenin) have accused Mao of being a "bad Leninist" for rejecting such a view?

As for the importance attached by Pfeffer to the views of Yao, Yao's (1975) article contained interesting points, along with many absurdities. Though I have never had great sympathy for this man, whom I regarded as Jiang Qing's ideological jester, I do not now wish to apply Lu Xun's maxim about "severely beating the dog that has fallen into the water" and to vent my spleen either on the beast itself or on Pfeffer for embracing it. Pfeffer's extensive reliance on Yao as the source for many of his ideas about Marx does raise, however, another question. According to the introductory note, Pfeffer has been working on his "reappraisal" since late 1972. What was he doing during the first two and a half years, before the Chinese press in February 1975 published most of the quotations from Marx which he employs, and before Yao came to his rescue? What precisely was the substance of his

critique then? If only Pfeffer had been able to make up his mind about the utility of studying the recently available materials, he could have read Mao's own analysis, in the early 1960s, of the phenomenon of the "new class." In that case, he might have anticipated, and could certainly have supplemented, Yao's discussion of the problem, instead of merely reproducing several pages from *Peking* [*Beijing*] *Review*.

But enough is enough. Most of Pfeffer's comments of any substance on my interpretation of Mao's thought are in fact based on *Marxism and Asia,* which Walder also discusses, if not with greater fairness, at least in considerably greater detail. Let me now turn, therefore, to the issues raised in, or with reference to, this book.

To begin with, I must express my astonishment that a journal with *Modern China*'s editorial policy should allow both Pfeffer and Walder to get away with such a flagrant instance of male chauvinism as putting my name first in all their references to the book, although Carrere's name precedes mine on the title page. No doubt they have done so because they are out to get me, rather than her, but their usage is nonetheless discourteous and incorrect. Both of us contributed to the work of preparing this volume on a basis of equality and the names were therefore deliberately put in alphabetical order. Naturally, I took primary responsibility for the portions dealing with China, as did my coauthor for the treatment of the Middle East and Soviet Central Asia. We were both directly involved, however, in the writing of the sections on Marx and Lenin, which principally exercise our two critics, and take joint and equal responsibility for the result. A minor but irritating point is that, as Americans should have learned by now, from the example of the present French president, double-barreled surnames of this kind, if they are to be abbreviated at all (and often their owners would rather they were not), should be reduced to the first and not to the second component. This book will thus be referred to here as Carrère and Schram (1969).

Walder, like Pfeffer, puts forward a travesty of my views as a straw man which he can subsequently knock down. In *Marxism and Asia,* he says, we fail to present Marx as "a thinker with a complex, coherent conception of the relationship between super-

structure and base." Such a presentation "is made plausible by pulling ambiguous, isolated quotes from widely different sources and, not surprisingly, declaring them 'fragmentary and inconclusive'." In fact, we drew this conclusion (Carrère and Schram, 1969: 15) not about Marx's thought as a whole, but specifically about "the writings of Marx and Engels on the problems of the non-European countries," as the sentence from which Walder has pulled these two adjectives explicitly says.

The passages from Marx and Engels to which this section of the introduction to *Marxism and Asia* refers do represent, of course, only a limited selection from their writings on the non-European world, especially as the main focus of the volume is on developments since Lenin's day. Many of them are, however, not in the slightest degree "ambiguous." In one of the most ludicrous statements in his whole voluminous article, Walder refers explicitly to our extracts from Marx's articles of 1853 on the British rule in India (Carrère and Schram, 1969: 115-119) and comments that Marx "in no way implied" that the process of "Europeanization" was inevitable, nor, "as Schram [and Carrère d'Encausse] seem to suggest . . . that this was a desirable or 'unfortunately necessary' process." Despite his view that American students of China should read more Marx firsthand, he must imagine that no one will in fact consult these particular texts, though they are easily available in many different collections. Anyone who does turn to them will surely begin to have serious doubts about Walder's reliability as an interpreter of Marx, on reading statements as such these:

> these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism.
>
> England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was actuated only by the vilest interests. . . . But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.
>
> England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.

> When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and *subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples,* then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain. [Carrère and Schram, 1969: 117-119, throughout; emphasis added]

This was, of course, only one stage of Marx's intellectual development, but it is farcical to pretend that this strain in his thinking never existed. He went on to develop the ideas about the possibility of a noncapitalist path in Russia to which Walder devotes a page or so. Curiously (or perhaps not so curiously), after citing *Marxism and Asia* in his passage on India, Walder completely fails to inform his readers that we discussed this issue as well (Carrère and Schram, 1969: 10-13) and rather conveys the impression that we deliberately neglected it. He also fails to note that, in the view of Marx and Engels, Russia could take advantage of the communes to bypass the capitalist stage of development *only* with the support and assistance of the Western European proletariat.

I could multiply the examples of Walder's crass misrepresentation of my views. Here I will cite only one more. I am said to be coresponsible for an "interpretation of Marx as a determinist" which makes of the development of the productive forces "an inexorable, 'objective' event, independent of 'human will' (Schram and d'Encausse, 1969: 108)." In fact, this page contains a reference to "peoples of the underdeveloped countries . . . driven by their impatience with existing conditions to transform Marx's teaching in the direction of a greater emphasis on the role of the human will as compared to objective reality." Erroneous, perhaps, in Walder's opinion, but hardly the same thing.

But it is time we turned to the serious business at hand, namely Walder's interpretation of Marx, and Mao, as neither "determinist" nor "voluntarist." There is much that is interesting and valuable in his discussion of these issues, and some of the points he makes can serve as a corrective to what I now see as an excessive emphasis in my earlier writings on the gulf between Mao and Marx. There are, however, some basic flaws in his reasoning which must be noted at the outset. They flow from the

facile dichotomy he establishes between the "atomistic" thinking of "the China field," which views superstructure and economic base as "independent variables reacting on each other," and his own "dialectical" and "organic" mode of analysis, and in the assumption that because he has a correct methodology, his conclusions are necessarily correct. If any member of the "China field" were so ignorant as to be unaware that Marx saw basis and superstructure as intimately linked to one another, he would indeed go badly astray. In seeking to correct this deviation, however, Walder himself seriously distorts Marx's thinking in the opposite direction.

"Different aspects of the social whole—like superstructure and economic base—are distinguished by Marx," he writes, "not because they are in reality separate 'factors,' but because they help to explain the social processes within the structured, 'organic' whole." Fair enough; with this view I entirely agree, and have always agreed. Walder then proceeds, however, to go beyond this reasonable and balanced formulation in two directions, both of them erroneous. On the one hand, referring to "inneraction" within a "dense structure," he suggests on occasion that the interrelated aspects of reality cannot be meaningfully distinguished. It is well known to all students of Marxism that, in his later years, Marx was less inclined to use the terminology of "basis" and "superstructure" and frequently spoke rather of the total structure *(Gesamtbau)* of a given social formation. While he saw society as an organic whole, however, he never adopted a defeatist attitude regarding the possibility of understanding the relationships among the elements composing it, and for this purpose he continued to employ the concepts of basis and superstructure as tools of analysis.

Walder admits as much in other passages of his article, but he then falls back to the position that Marx and Engels did not come down clearly in favor of the primacy of one dimension or another of this complex whole. In order to make this point, he aribtrarily cuts Engels' letter of 1890 to Bloch at the words: "There is an interaction of all these elements." This very sentence in fact goes on: "in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-

existent, as negligible), the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary." And in the next paragraph, Engels stated clearly: "We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions. Among these, the economic ones are ultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc., and indeed even the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one" (Marx and Engels, 1968: 682; this reference is equivalent to Walder's Marx and Engels, 1942: 475).

Unfortunately I do not have time, or space, to deal seriously with Walder's discussion of the problem of stages of historical development, but this is an important matter about which something must be said. Once again, Walder caricatures my views by sugesting that in my "determinist reading, Marx seems to imply . . . that . . . stages of history are distinct and separate, punctuated by the great political revolutions that mark their passing. In other words, feudal relations of production are not and cannot be transformed until after the bourgeois revolution." I never said or suggested any such absurd thing. Obviously, social revolutions in whatever era are long and complex processes which do not take place over night. It is also the case, however, in Marx's view, that the political revolutions which mark the passage, or an important stage in the passage, from the domination of one class to that of another are crucial moments in the transition between historical epochs. Walder "seems to imply" that they are not. Moreover, he shows a curious lack of sensitivity to the differences between historical circumstances. "To Schram," he writes, with reference to what I have said about Mao's vision of "sprouts of communism" in the China of the Great Leap Forward (Schram, 1971: 230-231), "it may come as a complete surprise that Marx saw 'sprouts' of capitalism dating to the late 1400s."

As indicated by the quotations included in the passage to which Walder is referring here, Mao himself frequently spoke of "stages" and the need to distinguish between them, both in the democratic and in the socialist revolution. This does not mean, however, that he saw the significance of such stages as identical in all historical epochs. We touch here on a basic point, to which both Walder and Pfeffer seem curiously blind, namely the clear distinction drawn by Marx between the "pre-history" before the

socialist revolution, in which men are dominated by nature and circumstance as by a blind force, and the ensuing period in which men consciously shape their relations with nature and with one another. Because of this, Marx's view of historical causality in the feudal or capitalist stages was markedly more "deterministic" (to use my own much-maligned term) than his vision of socialist society. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that Marx would have accepted Mao's view that "communist elements" could be actively cultivated in China even before socialism had been built, thus telescoping not one but two stages of development.

Walder's discussion of the role of the various classes in revolutions of different types is likewise unsatisfactory. As usual, he gives a false impression of my position by truncating and misinterpreting a brief quotation from *Marxism and Asia.* Here is what he tells his readers I said:

> Schram asserts, the "class nature of a given historical phase and the actual role of the various classes during this phase" must be closely associated in the determinist Marx. So quite naturally, "the bourgeois-democratic revolution which constituted the transition from feudalism to capitalism would likewise be carried out by the bourgeoisie."

To begin with, Walder has omitted the following sentence, which reads: "As for the proletariat, it would support the bourgeoisie in the democratic revolution, until the time came to put an end to the capitalist system by the socialist revolution, in which the workers in their turn would play the leading part" (Carrère and Schram, 1969: 19). This sentence, plus the last one Walder does quote, amount simply to a summary of the views set out by Marx and Engels in March 1850 in the "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League," which constitutes the locus classicus for Marx's own theory of the "permanent revolution" (Marx, 1973: 322-324; see also the discussion of this passage in Schram, 1963: xx-xxi).

Far more significant, however, are the tricks Walder has played with the first sentence, which he partly quotes and partly summarizes, that actually reads:

> In order to understand the spirit in which Lenin would later deal with the problems of the revolution in the non-European countries, one must consider not only the way in which he dissociated the "proletarian" party from the real proletariat, but also the dissociation between the class nature of a given historical phase and the actual role of the various classes during this phase.

Walder has turned this sentence inside out, inserted the entity "the determinist Marx," never mentioned here, and removed all reference to Lenin. Indeed, it is a startling and significant fact that the name of Lenin does not even appear in the list of references to his own article. It is interesting and perfectly justified to compare Mao's ideas with those of Marx, in order to see how he has revived certain concerns of original Marxism which had been largely lost sight of in the Leninist and Soviet experience. To imagine, on the other hand, that one can give an adequate account of the origins and development of Mao Ze-dong thought while leaving out such crucial links as the ideas of Lenin and Stalin is utterly ahistorical and absurd.

Here Walder seems to share the prejudices of Pfeffer, who complains that I believe "that the real origins of non-European revolutions and of Chinese Communism in particular lie in Leninism," and that I "basically accept the reduction of 'Asian Marxism' to Leninism." I have indeed written that Marxism first made its influence effectively felt in China in the form of Leninism, which provided both the conception of the party and the other organizational weapons which Mao Ze-dong and the other founders of the Chinese Communist Party employed during the early years of their struggle, and most of the theoretical formulations which served as the starting-point for the elaboration of their own ideological positions. Would Pfeffer (or Walder) deny this? Did not Mao, and do not the Chinese today, take pride in calling themselves Marxist-Leninists? To say this is not to "reduce" Mao's thought to Leninism, but merely to indicate the most important among the many sources from which he drew his ideas.

While I cannot accept that Walder has made quite such startling innovations as he claims in our understanding of Marx's thinking, and while I have taken issue with some aspects of his interpretation, he has set an example Pfeffer might well

emulate in reading Marx's own works and reflecting on them, rather than eating "precooked food" prepared by Yao and Zhang. His main contribution, however, lies—in my opinion—in his analysis of Mao's writings, and in his criticism of previous interpretations, including my own. I say this even though here, too, as in dealing with Marx, he produces in many respects a caricature of my writings. To give only one example, he deplores my failure to engage in "a scholarly dialogue" with Holubnychy about Mao's dialectics, and cites as an example of my rigid and obstinate attitude an article (Schram, 1967) of which in fact only twelve lines out of ten pages are devoted to Holubnychy. The remainder of this review article, which he never refers to at all, was in fact directed against the attempt by Cohen of the CIA to demonstrate that Mao was basically just a disciple of Stalin who had contributed nothing significant to Marxism.

Walder apparently shares Pfeffer's view that the main aim of all my work has been to discredit Mao, and to rub my hands in glee at the spectacle of "another Marxist-Leninist bit[ing] the dust." Were this the case, I would not have been singled out by Cohen, and more recently by his colleagues of the KGB, as an "apologist for Mao" (see Cohen, 1967; Pashchenko, 1976). That, of course, I am not either—except to the extent that for some people in Washington, and everyone in Moscow, anyone who sees anything good in the Chinese revolution is an "apologist." My aim has been neither to praise or denigrate Mao, but to understand as much as I could about the origins, development, and significance of his thought and to lay before the reader a balanced and documented argument which would enable him to judge for himself.

This does not mean that I regard everything I have written previously as correct, or that I imagine that I have nothing more to learn. Though I never went all the way in suggesting that Mao was more of a populist than a Leninist, I now think I did go too far in this direction, under the influence of the ultraleftist tendencies which had manifested themselves during the Cultural Revolution, and had not yet been officially repudiated when I revised earlier work (Schram, 1969; Carrère and Schram, 1969) for publication. There are other points in these books which reflect the same context—for example, the remark about "a

revolution which has nothing in common with Marxism" (Carrère and Schram, 1969: 112), which has aroused so much ire on the part of both Pfeffer and Walder. While this phrase was directed also at Debray's biological and geographic determinism, it was aimed at the Chinese in the first instance, and was inspired by practices such as the Confucian-style rote learning of passages from *Quotations from Chairman Mao*. (These are, of course, now recognized by the Chinese to have constituted a deviation, though they blame it on Lin Biao.) I would by no means formulate the same judgment today, though I believe the problem to be rather more complicated than Pfeffer suggests when he concludes, without putting forward any arguments whatsoever, that "Mao is more than anything a Marxist-Leninist."

I continue to believe, despite Pfeffer and Walder, that there are certain basic postulates of Marx's own thinking which cannot be rejected without revising Marxism to the point where the label becomes largely meaningless. One of these is the axiom of working-class leadership over the socialist stage of the revolution, and over the peasant allies of the proletariat in agrarian countries. I make no apology, therefore, for the statement quoted by Pfeffer to the effect that it is "wildly unorthodox" to talk about the sons and daughters of the working class learning proletarian class consciousness from the peasants. Looking at Mao's thought as a whole, however, during the last quarter-century of his life, I find it to be far more subtle and many-sided, and in many respects far more Marxist, than I had previously believed.

It is, of course, only since the publication of the recently available volumes of Mao's speeches that it has been possible to form any serious idea of the substance of his thought as development theory or in any other respect. I have begun the process of rethinking my position in the introduction to *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed* (1974), which Walder has ignored and Pfeffer noticed only with an insult. I will persevere with it in other writings, now in the press or as yet not completed. Walder, too, has begun to read Mao seriously, and so have several other people in "the China field," now at work on new interpretations of his thought. Let us, as Chairman Mao urged, "create an environment of study" (Schram, 1974: 154), and perhaps we can yet persuade Pfeffer to join in.

NOTE

1. In the course of his last-minute revisions, Pfeffer did insert one reference to Schram (1974), but the content of this single sentence (to which I shall return below) scarcely indicates that he had given the book much thought.

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