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Motivating workers and peasants has always commanded a share of center stage in the Chinese leaders' plans for shaping a revolutionary modernized industrial society. In the 1950s, borrowing from the Soviet model, they mainly utilized an extrinsic material and nonmaterial incentive system— mechanisms such as wages, bonuses, work points, payments for inventions and innovations, emulative contests, honorific awards to outstanding individual workers and peasants and work groups which linked performance directly with the amounts of material or nonmaterial recompense. Intrinsic motivation—workers' and peasants' performance sparked by the individual's real or expected gratification from a job well done, the challenge of work tasks, strong identification with the work group and its tasks, the realization of important collective objectives and values, substantial involvement in the processes of decision-making in the work unit—also existed then in inchoate form. Not until the Great Leap Forward, however, did any important elements of an

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intrinsic motivation system emerge and not until after the Cultural Revolution did a pattern of such elements spread widely (Hoffmann, 1967, 1974; Howe, 1973; Riskin, 1975).

The dissatisfaction of Chinese Communist Party [CCP] leaders with existing extrinsic incentives arises from the realization that such incentives—even where consonant with the socialist principle of renumeration according to work—not only do not lead directly to or prepare workers and peasants for the emergence of mechanisms more appropriate to the communist principle of remuneration according to need, but actually reinforce individualistic and materialistic values and work styles, thus compounding the difficulties of overcoming strong bourgeois continuities. The cultivation of collectivist work styles, the internalization of revolutionary values, the provision of direct gratification that cements the work team's interpersonal bonds and overcomes preoccupation with how much recompense a particular job yields are major objectives of leaders concerned with transforming the social relations of work.

Our task here is to see how intrinsic motivation is developing in some Chinese factories, how this has changed the work environment (transforming roles of workers, cadres, technicians), and the extent to which such change is consistent with revolutionary values and objectives touching on such issues as work style, elitism, and the mass line. To the extent that these changes and issues are effectively grasped, insight into an important process of evolving social relations in work may emerge.

The description and analysis that follow are of the recent Chinese factory situation. Since 1949, policy and practice in managing factories have undergone several variations in the search and struggle to devise work modes and relationships consistent with the Maoist vision of a maturing socialism and of communism as an ultimate goal. Until 1956, China followed the Soviet model of "one-man management" in state industrial enterprises. Chairman Mao found this model quite unacceptable and, late in 1956 at the Eighth Party Congress, "collective leadership" in factories was annunciated as the new policy: "factory-manager responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee" (Schurmann, 1968: 263-278, 284-285; Brugger, 1976).

The Leap which followed was a period of radical experimentation with some of the fundamental Maoist work concepts. Factory managers' power was diluted further and a variety of new mechanisms was tried (e.g., three-in-one combinations). Some results were quite negative, but others laid the groundwork for institutions flourishing today (Schurmann, 1968: 287-288, 293-297; Andors, 1974). From 1961 to the Cultural Revolution which began in 1966, there was often a lack of any clear-cut managerial authority in the factories. In some instances managers took complete charge, in others confusion reigned, in still others continuity with the Leap was sustained and developed, laying the basis for current practices (Schurmann, 1968: 297-308; Andors 1974; Richman, 1969: 789ff.). The Cultural Revolution generated a fundamental policy struggle in which Mao and his followers ultimately emerged victorious and began implementing changes consonant with their strategy and goals throughout Chinese society. Some results in Chinese factories are the focus of our attention below.

CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL SETTING

China's industrial organization and structure have been modified significantly since the 1950s with major modifications an outgrowth of both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The movement has been away from the rather centralized organization under the First Five-Year Plan toward varied kinds of operational decentralization in different periods. One student of the Chinese economy has characterized its structure in the early 1970s as "cellular" with emphasis on self-reliance and self-sufficiency: "At present the country seems composed of a myriad of small discrete units, although there are at work technical forces which . . . ought to be breaking down this cellular arrangement" (Donnithorne, 1972: 605). Since then a somewhat clearer, though not sharply focused, view of an overall organizational and administrative structure which combines centralization and decentralization dialectically has been emerging.

In general, the organizational relationship from the central authorities in Beijing (Peking) to the factories is dualistic with communications being vertical—from central ministries and the Party central committee down through the chain of command to factories, in particular industries—as well as horizontal (territorial), from noncentral administrations (province, city, region, county) to factories in their jurisdiction. There are certain industries directly under the central government's ministerial jurisdiction (armaments, foreign trade, and so on), but the development since the Cultural Revolution, though not always consistently, has been toward provinces and municipal administrations with the central government retaining important planning and resource allocation controls. Many instances of joint control have also surfaced in which provincial jurisdiction is shared with municipalities or counties. This movement toward more decentralized operational administration with continuing centralized control—some of it probably still experimental—is consonant with Maoist notions of self-reliance, the mass line, and local initiative (Donnithorne, 1972; Lardy, 1975).

Within the factories, the present administrative and managerial modes have evolved from the Cultural Revolution, though some of their elements go back to earlier years. Each factory is a distinct accounting unit, but shares decision-making with higher party and government authorities. So far as the basic ideological framework for running factories is concerned, the model set of principles is the Anshan Iron and Steel Company Constitution which was affirmed by Chairman Mao in an instruction he issued on March 22, 1960. This Constitution is viewed as a "fundamental charter for the working class . . . to win success in running socialist enterprises" (Summary, 1975b; Lee, 1973) and has been publicized throughout China along with the national model unit in industry—the Daqing oil enterprises in Heilongjiang province.

The Constitution emphasizes five principles that ought to govern the operation of all factories if socialist enterprises are to cultivate the proper proletarian work styles, attitudes, and motivation essential for the emergence of communism. If a factory is functioning smoothly according to these principles,

then "bourgeois right" in pay scales as in other activities will be weakened—becoming a vestige and eventually disappearing—and revolutionary values will be reinforced and internalized. The Constitution's five principles are: (1) politics in command—all plant policies must be subordinate to local, regional, and national policies; (2) party leadership is to be strengthened and constantly defined for the workers; (3) vigorous mass movements are to be launched involving workers in mass technical and production campaigns; (4) cadres are to participate regularly in labor, workers are to participate in management, irrational and outmoded work rules and regulations are to be reformed with close cooperation and interaction among workers, cadres and technicians at various hierarchic tiers; and (5) technical innovation and revolution are to be accelerated, shaping modern technology to the requirements of the Chinese revolutionary environment (Summary, 1975b; Hoffmann, 1974: 121-122; Daily Report, 1976; Weida, 1970: 5-6).

The implementation of these five principles takes place in a certain organizational setting in each factory: several key units exercise varying control functions. The factory is a basic-level administrative unit. Its principal controlling group is the Party committee which provides the general policy for the enterprise—a kind of board of directors. The committee's membership, elected by the Party members, includes workers, cadres, and technicians who belong to the CCP. Large basic-level units or enterprises are organized into Party committees, general branches, branches, and small groups, all of which are important policy discussion forums, and at every tier of organizational structure the Party unit oversees the tasks of the plant. The size of the Party committee in a factory varies. The number might total 15 to 25 with a secretary and one to four deputies. Except for the secretaries, who are involved full time in their committee work, Party committee members are actively engaged in production (Schurmann, 1968: 155-156; China Reconstructs, 1974a: 2).

The revolutionary comittee, which is responsible for the day-by-day management of the factory, likewise has an elected membership that ranges in different factories from 10 to 25 and is drawn from the same constituencies—workers, cadres, tech-

nicians. The leaders of the committee—the chairman and several vice-chairmen—usually come from the leadership group in the Party committee (e.g., the Party committee secretary probably is the revolutionary committee chairman). The overlap in leaderships strengthens Party control. In one regard, however, the revolutionary committee is different from the Party committee: its composition is more representative since non-Party persons can be and are commonly elected to the committee. The chairman and the vice-chairmen are the ones responsible for management and supervision of production and other plant functions on a daily, full-time basis. The relationship between Party and revolutionary committees is not firmly established and has varied considerably in different periods since the Cultural Revolution, and in different administrative jurisdictions and individual factories (New York Times, 1971; China News Summary, 1974).

Another representative body—the trade-union committee—is functioning again in the factories, after a period of suspension from January 1967 during the Cultural Revolution to the beginning of 1973. The primary trade-union committee in the past had at least 10 members with an elected chairman and several vice-chairmen. This committee assists in carrying out the policies and mandates of the Party and revolutionary committees and since the reinstitution of the trade unions in 1973 has been mainly involved in political education, reinforcing Maoist work principles (such as the Anshan Constitution), as well as executing the day-to-day trade-union functions: supervising the social insurance system, overseeing factory safety regulations, sponsoring cultural and educational programs (Hoffmann, 1974: 127-129, 134-143).

The People's Liberation Army (PLA), a venerated institution which engages in many extramilitary activites as well as its primary defense role, has also carried out important tasks in factories—especially during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. In many tumultuous factory conflicts during the Cultural Revolution involving workers and Red Guard students, the PLA exercised a restraining and mediatory influence. And in the post-Cultural Revolution reorganization, many PLA members were elected to factory revolutionary committees to help in

conciliating factions and redirecting cadres' and workers' energies toward achieving Maoist objectives. In addition, PLA members have entered industrial enterprises in large numbers to toil alongside the workers to promote certain production practices, to act as exemplars of correct performance, to reinforce the importance of increasing output, and sometimes even—again as in the Cultural Revolution—to act as mediators, or in the extreme, as a restraining force when labor troubles arise (Daily Report, 1975k, 1975n; New York Times, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d).

It is within this operating committee framework that collectivist administrative and managerial styles are cultivated. The chairman of the revolutionary committee and his vice-chairmen function as the responsible administrative and managerial heads of the factory, subject not only to the controls of local revolutionary and Party committees and their own internal committees, but also to the mandates of Party and Government transmitted through the mass media and internally through an elaborate communications network (Oksenberg, 1974). In addition, within the factory there are numerous formal and informal mechanisms through which the plant personnel individually and collectively make their voices heard. Thus, while decisions are made by the chairman of the revolutionary committee, as we shall see below, he or she is subject to a flow of communications inputs and feedback from a variety of sources as well as continuous and periodic formal and informal impacts from his staff and rank-and-file plant personnel.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the Chinese factory is much more than a production plant. While productive activity is its primary focus, it generates a number of services and touches on the most important aspects of the lives of workers and their families. Housing, meals, day care, nurseries, medical care, recreation, education, culture, are among the services provided continuously to all attached to the factory, and thus impose day-to-day management and decision-making.

The way in which workers are viewed in Chinese society and the manner in which they are organized in the factory provide the setting for perceiving and assessing the process of worker participation. Following Marxist ideology, workers are accorded a

prominent role in the development of socialism. As proletarians, they are expected to lead in the propagation of revolutionary ideas and in the setting of examples for collectivist behavior and the inculcation of advanced socialist values. Certainly in the mass media—in art, in theater, and in balletic opera—the worker is projected as the exemplary socialist citizen. In talking with Chinese people from many walks of life other than the narrowly defined "working class" (mainly blue-collar operatives), one clearly senses the high status accorded to workers and work, and this sense of worth is reinforced at many levels in the mass media as they report various events (e.g., worker conferences and congresses) and project images of model workers and worker groups to be emulated.[1]

In the plant itself workers naturally comprise a very large proportion of the total work force. For example, in the summer of 1973 the Beijing No. 1 Machine Tools Plant, which produced 5,000 to 6,000 machine tools, had a total work force of 7,400 of whom 6,450 (87.2%) were workers, 500 (6.8%) were technicians, and 450 (6.1%) were administrative personnel (one-third of the workers were women).[2] These large worker contingents are organized structurally in different ways. The *technical,* as distinct from *human,* organization of the labor force in a factory or mill follows a pattern such as: a small number of shops (or divisions), a large number of production groups, and a still larger number of production teams (Schurmann, 1968: 228; China Reconstructs, 1974a: 5-6).

The direct and fringe payments (extrinsic material incentive mechanisms) of workers in the plant follow certain patterns, some of which are ideological objects of change. Workers' wages are determined generally through an eight-grade wage system (analogous to the Soviet format), with a rough ratio of three to one (¥105 to ¥35) between the most skilled and the least skilled, and with the average monthly wage in factories being about Y60.[3] Piece-rates and bonuses have, for the most part, been eliminated in Chinese factories. Material extrinsic incentive mechanisms have been subject to constant criticism since the Cultural Revolution. The recent onslaught on "bourgeois right" is paralleled by the continuous extension of collectivist processes (such as

expanding roles in decision-making) which tend to internalize the socialist values propagated by the Maoists. Fringe benefits range widely in the factory: social insurance including clinic and health care, subsidized factory housing, low-cost factory restaurants, factory-run day care centers, nurseries, elementary and secondary schools (Hoffmann, 1967: 17-42, 58-78; 1974: 93-122, 224-237).

The internal setting of the factory which we have been delineating needs to be supplemented with some information on how workers join the factory work force, how they are trained, how upgrading is achieved, and how labor is allocated. Technical training is afforded all elementary and secondary students. Since the Cultural Revolution, newly graduated high school students do not go directly to colleges or universities; they are assigned to factories, communes, the PLA, and other work units where, after at least two years of service, they may apply to colleges if approved by their peers and supervisors. If they are admitted to college, they are then on leave from their factory or unit on whose behalf their advanced training is undertaken, and they usually return when their course of study is completed. At colleges there now are factories so that theory (book learning) can be applied on site. In many factories there are now new July 21 Colleges where workers take regular courses to advance their skill and understanding. In addition, factories usually have spare-time educational offerings in technical and cultural subjects in which many workers enroll after work. There is no labor market that allocates labor through differential wages according to supply and demand. Instead, workers are assigned to jobs through labor bureaus that follow set procedures. Workers may request assignment to specific areas and some may move this way. When campaigns are mounted to settle new areas, volunteers can opt for assignment there (Hoffmann, 1974: 62-92).

ROLES OF CADRES AND TECHNICIANS

The roles that workers play in factories are defined to a considerable extent by how cadres and technicians are expected to

and do in fact carry out their functions. To the extent that the Maoist concept of a nonself-perpetuating bureaucracy free of elitist ethos is realized, the "hired hand" mentality recedes and the possibilities for genuine worker self-management are enhanced. Furthermore, if cadres and technicians are effectively integrated into a collectivist *human* organization of the plant's division of labor, worker self-realization and activity to that end are more likely to be attained (Summary, 1975d).

Supervisory and technical personnel in the Chinese factory are called upon to carry heavy responsibilities without the expectation of considerable extrinsic reward either in material compensation or in assurance of rapid promotion and stellar careers. Their task is to serve the factory well and they know that the dual responsibility system (vertical and horizontal) increases the possibility that serious failures will invite criticism and dismissal from their leadership positions. Moreover, leaders are expected to be humble, work readily and cooperatively with workers, display proletarian virtues, and struggle toward revolutionary goals. One biographical note (China Reconstructs, 1974b: 2; Peking Review, 1975c) on a factory leader projects certain exemplary qualities:

> Like the rank-and-file workers, Chen Shih-jung wears an ordinary gray cotton suit, lives in a simple flat and cycles to work from his home to the mill in the city's outskirts. Before being told, we would never have spotted him as the top leader of the . . . Mill. This slim, middle-aged cadre joined the revolutionary struggle against Japanese aggression . . . when he was a boy of 13. Today, he is secretary of the mill's Party committee.

The requirement that leaders behave in model ways is buttressed by a set of institutional arrangements which are gauged to mold such leaders. These arrangements touch on leaders' material recompense (direct and indirect), work-styles and commitments, political and human awareness, responsiveness to criticism, and other aspects of their parts in the social process of the factory and its numerous extensions.

So far as salaries are concerned, cadres and technicians have had graded salary steps analogous in form to the eight-grade

wage scales used to compensate workers. Before the Cultural Revolution, these cadre and technician scales rose to maxima three and four times those for industrial workers. Since the Cultural Revolution, in line with Maoist egalitarian mandates and the stress on intrinsic motivation, pay for cadres and technicians has been telescoped and maxima in factories now range between ¥150 and ¥225 a month, one and one-fourth to about two times the industrial workers' maxima, and only about half the highest salaries paid government leaders. But even these patterns are violated in interesting ways: in many factories the highest paid person is not the top leader (manager), but may be a very senior skilled worker, a physician, or an engineer. For example, in the Shanghai Irregular Shape Steel Tube Plant in 1973, the highest pay was ¥125 a month for a senior worker. The chairman of the revolutionary committee, who managed the plant, received ¥108 a month (Hoffmann, 1974: 98-104; New York Times, 1975m; Daily Report, 1975m).[4]

As for other material perquisites, in the days before the Cultural Revolution it was common for higher level cadres and technicians to be given favored treatment on housing, transportation, and schooling for their children. Since the Cultural Revolution, ideological mandate makes such preferential treatment anathema. While it is likely that special privileges are still enjoyed by members of the bureaucracy, the expectations are that cadres' public morality is high and, given the media and its penchant for criticism and the campaigns against "bourgeois" behavior, it is quite likely that special treatment has been greatly reduced (Richman, 1971). When the writer was in China in 1973, persistent inquiries on the private use of a factory's cars by the leading cadres occasioned exasperated protestations that it did not happen and that if it did, it would become a matter of wide public discussion and criticism.

The Maoist demands on leaders' behavior include humility, sensitivity to workers' working conditions, and awareness of the actual production process. Chairman Mao had been quite clear on demanding cadre participation in manual labor as an ongoing collectivist requirement aimed at developing and reinforcing such behaviors:

> It is necessary to maintain the system of cadre participation in collective productive labour. The cadres of our Party and state are ordinary workers and not overlords sitting on the backs of people. By taking part in collective productive labour, the cadres maintain extensive, constant and close ties with the working people. This is a major measure of fundamental importance for a socialist system; it helps to overcome bureaucracy and to prevent revisionism and dogmatism. [Peking Review, 1975a: 16]

That such participation in labor will become a regular meaningful involvement in the work process, rather than an occasional, token event, is clearly the desired result which is to be paralleled by selected workers participating regularly for a short time in managerial positions. Regularization and reasonably full participation take a variety of forms. One way is scheduling such work on a particular day of the week when cadres are assigned to labor alongside factory workers on various jobs, dealing with different work problems as they arise. (Public display of cadres' days at physical labor may be required.) Another way is to have a large number of cadres from higher administrative units go down en masse to spend a fixed period at various factories, mines, or communes, engaging in the physical labor aspects of production (China Reconstructs, 1974b: 2-4; Daily Report, 1975a, 1974d; Peking Review, 1975a).

The participation-in-physical-labor program is only one such mechanism aimed at keeping cadres in communication with production realities and developing collectivist styles, and it has been a longstanding practice. A more recent variation of this program, issuing from the Cultural Revolution as a more concentrated means of attacking bureaucratism, "commandism," and just plain arrogance, has been the May 7 Cadre Schools in the countryside where cadres are sent for extended periods, usually six months, to be "re-educated by the peasants" on a full-time basis. On May 7, 1966, Chairman Mao issued an instruction which laid the basis for setting up such schools where cadres "study Marxism and take part in collective labor in production. They also spend . . . time in the surrounding villages learning about life there. All this helps them to remold their world outlook and better take the stand of the laboring people" (China Reconstructs, 1974c: 5).

The schools include cadres from an array of fields or from one particular field who are on leave with pay from their jobs while they pursue the remolding curriculum. In addition to study, physical labor at the school for maintenance, and labor in the nearby commune fields, the cadres engage in criticism sessions at the school as well as at nearby communes. This is supposed to help "the cadres change their attitude toward physical labor and learn more about production." The work activities vary and might "find the chairman of a county revolutionary committee working in the fields, a school principal as a cook, or a factory director herding cattle" (Daily Report, 1974a). It should be noted, though, that these schools for the most part keep the cadres separate from the masses.

Cadres and technicians in factories also find themselves subject to institutionalized internal and external criticism mechanisms: they must respond to different collective constituencies as well as random individual complaints. The already mentioned dual (vertical and horizontal) control lines that circumscribe factory activity are pathways of criticism. Special meetings are held by the factory's leaders to solicit criticisms of the operation of the plant and the cadres' work style. A regular six-month criticism meeting—open-door rectification—is held in some factories to uncover problems through criticism. Ad hoc criticism sessions are periodically convened at the behest of the party or revolutionary committee to deal with a pressing problem. Regular visits to enterprises consuming the factory's products are arranged to gather evaluations of the products and service. The factory's trade union group may hold sessions on the quality of political work, labor insurance, safety conditions, or welfare. Another form of criticism is the wall poster (dazibao) which appears in specified places in the factory and may be used by anyone to give vent to a grievance or complaint. A very powerful form of external criticism comes into play in a plant when a campaign, such as the Lin Biao-Confucius movement of 1974, is launched throughout the country. The metaphorical criticism given nationwide prominence becomes the vehicle for searching criticism of numerous shortcomings the local details of which can be utilized to document a more general complaint. For example,

"restrain oneself and restore the rites" (used in connection with the Confucius criticism) can be translated into "putting material incentives in command" (overemphasizing material extrinsic remuneration) or other examples of negative practice (China Reconstructs, 1974b: 4; 1975a: 8-15).

EXPANDING ROLES OF WORKERS

At the same time as cadres' and technicians' roles are more sharply defined in nonelitist and nonpreferential terms, and as new institutional mechanisms are devised to ensure that bureaucrats' consciousness is kept "pure" in the service of the people, and that their activities are constantly subject to mass review and criticism, the opportunities for workers to participate, formally and informally, have been increased. (Workers also play a role as representatives on government bodies outside the factories and on worker propaganda teams overseeing the universities and other schools in the locality.) The Chinese factory is expected to be a vital experimental organization attempting to adapt technical structure and function to human needs rather than the opposite. A set of mechanisms which may achieve such an outcome has evolved in some factories and is utilized in varying degrees throughout the country.

With the background of organizational process and relationship already drawn, we direct attention at how workers carry out their parts in the factory process. Are their roles fundamentally similar to those in other industrialized economies or do they hold the seeds of a radically different industrial plant and process? Do workers have any significant part in the management and decisions that direct the factory in its productive work? Is there a functional process at work which integrates all workers, cadres, and technicians in a human organizational structure that reinforces collectivist methods and relations? We pose these questions, which can only be very tentatively answered, as benchmarks in gauging how the Chinese worker participates in the management of the factory, in the shaping of his or her work and living environments.

We have already seen that the Chinese worker is represented on the controlling bodies of the factory and is heavily involved in the criticism mechanisms which have been molded in China over the last quarter of a century. Formally such devices in themselves do not represent any startling differences between China and other industrial countries. The Chinese worker's votes, however, can probably have a veto power. More probably nominees who would not command popular support will not be put forth. Criticism mechanisms, unless integrated into the daily processes of the organization, are capable of becoming institutionalized rituals, though the Chinese criticism sessions seem to be quite alive and also seem to serve important functions. But clearly, periodic voting and criticism would represent minimal kinds of worker self-management. We must look beyond worker representation to see how other institutional mechanisms work and whether they do in fact provide a substantial basis for worker self-management of a qualitatively significant kind.

There is a set of group mechanisms that the Chinese have experimented with and cultivated since the 1950s which involve the workers as well as cadres and technicians directly and indirectly in many operational decisions. They are all collective in form, though the group size varies according to the general function and its particular application, and they all modify, in some ways, the conventional technical organization of the production process. Even today they vary among factories as each unit experiments with "new socialist things." Whether through them, as public Chinese statements claim, "the rank and file [workers] take part in all aspects of management" (China Reconstructs, 1974a: 5) remains to be seen (Andors, 1974).

One collective form—the three-in-one combination—has been widely expanded since the Cultural Revolution though its origins go back to the 1950s. It is a work group which brings together three different kinds of staff (usually workers, cadres, and technicians—but other sets too: old, middle-aged, and young workers and technicians) to deal with any number of work functions or problems. It aims at stimulating creative work styles as well as undermining elitism, bureaucratic exclusivism, one-man decision-making, alienation, the mystique of expertness, and

other Maoist targets in the old line technical organization of work. Let us look at some examples, remembering that all factories do not have the same types since local initiative obtains.

First, there is the three-in-one economic management group. It is made up of workers, cadres, and technicians who are expected to participate in all phases of management: welfare and workers' living conditions, technology and production, finance, safety, and political and ideological education throughout the plant and at all levels—the plant, the shops, the work groups. In one factory, 800 workers, about one-third of the total, were elected to these groups. At the plant level the deputy chairmen of the revolutionary committee (cadres), heads of finance, supply and marketing (technicians), and workers deal together with operating and technical problems as they arise. Similar groups exist in the shops and among the work groups in regular and special activities—meetings, investigations, inspections—to assist plant leaders to deal with problems and to advise and check on these leaders (China Reconstructs, 1974a: 5-6; Bettelheim, 1974: 21-32; Summary, 1976a).

Other three-in-one purposes, within or outside such management groups, include cooperation, teaching, learning, and problem-solving. Some of the specific uses to which these "triple combinations" are put are: designing and developing new products, introducing technical innovations, solving technical problems (repairing machines, adapting machines for new use, eliminating flaws in production quality), cutting costs, carrying out demonstrations (to transmit expertise from one group to another), evaluating new products, investigating work performance, and revising plant rules and regulations. As the three-in-one groups gather experience, their scope of activity widens and more members of each constituency get involved (Daily Report, 1972; Richman, 1969: 58, 251, 258, 276; China Reconstructs, 1974a: 708; Peking Review, 1975b).

Another collective form in which workers participate in the administrative and management of some Chinese factories is the veteran workers' advisory group. The unit, made up of veteran workers with wide-ranging production experience and with high levels of political consciousness, attends all important party

committee meetings and is involved in discussions of major questions affecting plant operations as well as executing investigative and technical tasks assigned to it by the party committee. The technical tasks undertaken include a wide set of problems arising from the various production operations of the plant. The limits of these activities are not clear, since some events occurring in the factory are unpredictable, yet the group may be called upon to assist in handling them if they appropriately can (China Reconstructs, 1975b).

In one Shenyang factory the veteran workers' advisory group was organized as an outgrowth of plant criticism of "the revisionist line." The group totals 300 veteran production workers elected by the workers in each shop. The members of the group have an average work experience of 21 years. Their activities, carried out after work, are part of the trade union's functions and include considerable political study as well as technical production questions (China Reconstructs, 1975b: 40).

Another method for worker input in management in some factories is provided in the organization of production groups, basic producing units of around 50 workers. The group has its production and trade union leaders (cadres), but also "five responsible members," workers elected by their peers, to assure worker participation in all decisions affecting the group. In one plant, the five workers are responsible explicitly for political propaganda, work operations, quality of work, accounting, safety, workers' welfare, and daily living conditions. The five meet regularly on specified days of the week to deal with the work situation and its problems. On Saturdays, a general meeting is held with all the workers in the group to discuss production and management questions as well as publicly to commend outstanding workers. The cadre-worker unit involves itself in a wide range of events important to the workers' existence, not just to the technical management of production. For example, the "five responsible worker-managers" concern themselves, as a group, and singly, with the illness of a worker's child (one makes a visit), with criticisms about conditions written on the group's wall newspaper (dazibao), and with personal problems of an individual worker (China Reconstructs, 1974a: 5-6; Summary 1976a).

Mass movements are also widely used in factories to deal with a variety of plant issues that usually are of a general nature and that lend themselves to inputs from the experiences of the mass of workers. Mao placed a high value on the creativity of the masses and his notion "from the masses" is expected to be continuously implemented. Mass movements of a wide range have been carried out in Chinese factories and other producing units for many years to accomplish numerous objectives: to lower costs, to raise productivity, to stimulate innovation and new design, to develop aspects of decision-making, to improve proletarian work style. One factory application of the mass line approach deals with the problem of changing plant rules and regulations. The workers in a shop meet to discuss the current rules and regulations, analyzing their strengths and shortcomings, and which ones are to be modified, left alone, or dropped. Every worker in the group drafts his or her proposed regulations, which are coordinated and modified and a final draft is presented to the plant's three-in-one combination responsible for finally producing the new rules. That group edits the final draft, and the new rules and regulations are then ready for trial performance (China Reconstructs, 1974a: 708; Hoffmann, 1974: 117; Summary, 1976b).

Workers also provide input in the formulation and acceptance of economic plan quotas or targets. The central planners in the government will set major targets, but their final legitimation requires a feedback process from the operating units via intervening responsible governmental and party agencies so that ultimate responsibility for achieving targets is grounded in opportunities to affect the setting of targets. Such responsibility may help undermine dependence on material incentives. Even longer range plans receive worker input. In a Guangxi mine, for example, the tripling of output over a ten-year peiod was agreed upon by the miners after mass discussion under the leadership of the party committee. This discussion occurred after some workers manintained that planning was for cadres, engineers, and technicians, not workers. The opposite view was put forth and accepted and the miners then became heavily involved in the planning process. A three-in-one planning committee was

organized for the entire mine with subgroups set up for the different work sections. Workers accounted for 80% of the committee membership and the ultimate agreement on the long-run target resulted after the process of mass and committee discussions (Daily Report, 1975i).

Activities of the trade-union committees in Chinese factories also offer additional opportunities and initiatives for worker involvement in plant management. As already indicated, trade-union responsibility covers political and ideological indoctrination, part-time technical and cultural education, plant safety, social welfare and insurance administration, and the like. Workers are organized into study groups by their work group's trade-union leader. These study groups use classic Marxist texts as well as current tracts on the meaning of campaigns such as the Lin Biao-Confucius or "bourgeois right" criticism movements. Discussions of the criticism often focus on factory political questions, e.g., "production in command" or "material incentives in command," and become a forum for airing of grievances and criticism of plant policy followed by an agenda for action (Daily Report, 1974b; 1974c; Summary, 1975c; Hoffmann, 1974: 123-150).

Paralleling the participation of cadres in productive labor periodically in order to develop "cadre-workers" is the assumption of managerial posts in plant departments and offices by selected workers. During the Cultural Revolution, "workers' investigation groups" were created in factories to participate in management. The advent of the revolutionary committee put these worker groups in the background, but some revival has taken place. For example, in the Shanghai Watch and Clock Parts Plant, worker participation in management positions is being cultivated. In the past the party committee selected workers for such posts at the same time as cadres were sent down to participate in labor. Now the workers are recommended by their peers, approved by the party committee, subject to study classes in preparation, and then assigned to their posts. A new group of "worker-cadres" is being developed in many factories as part of the revolutionary process to eliminate the "three gaps," in this in-

stance the gap between mental and physical labor (Daily Report, 1975j).

One of China's new ways of providing advanced training and education for workers is the July 21 College set up in some factories during the Cultural Revolution. Curricula cover an array of technical and professional subjects and areas. These educational-training institutions, as well as other similar ones, not only provide workers with greater opportunities to be vertically mobile through advanced training, thus helping to put an "end to monopoly of technology by a few intellectuals," but also cast many workers in instructional and curriculum development roles as this innovative addition to the factory is experimented with. Educational and technical decisions on the scope, direction, and detailed linkages between actual work in the factory and instructional content are made by workers, technicians, and cadres (Daily Report 1975b, 1975g, 1975o).

Though we have already discussed the use of wall newspapers in the context of cadres and technicians being subject to criticism, their use from the workers' standpoint calls for comment. The writing of a wall newspaper (dazibao) criticism may be an individual act (though it often is put up by a group of workers), but it usually generates collective responses from cadres, technicians, and other workers. In one plant, for example, five workers put up a big-character poster criticizing party committee members for not having recently taken part in physical labor. The committee members responded with a poster accepting the criticism and calling a meeting at which they responded positively to the critical workers' complaints by setting up a particular day for participation every week. In another factory, the party committee decided to pay overtime to workers in response to considerable worker pressure. A group of other workers put up a wall newspaper objecting to this saying "one should work hard and aim at raising output quickly and not for monetary incentives." The party committee then reversed themselves after public discussion of the question (China Reconstructs, 1975a: 8-10; China News Summary, 1975a; Summary, 1975a). These and other examples reflect the fact that there is in many Chinese factories an impor-

tant collective process going on which makes all questions bearing on the work and living environment collective questions and therefore subject to public debate and resolution.

Not only do workers criticize management through factory wall newspapers, newsletters, and formal criticism sessions, but they also have access to the mass media to voice critical opinions and make policy suggestions. This kind of activity has a two-pronged effect so far as worker participation is concerned: it develops their skills as intellectuals (writers) who can effectively articulate policy positions for their co-workers and themselves and stand as models for other workers to emulate, and it also reinforces the practice of looking at factory work-decisions critically from the workers' point of view. The recent dictatorship-of-the-proletariat compaign has involved factory workers widely in worker theory study groups that link the study of important Marxist-Maoist tracts to the concrete situations of perpetuation of "bourgeois right" in the factories and has assumed the character of a huge nationwide mass campaign to attenuate "bourgeois" attitudes and practices (China News Summary, 1975b; Daily Report, 1975f).

Workers also seize important factory design and production initiatives that elicit wide acclaim by authorities as reflecting exemplary proletarian practice. Such initiatives include designing and producing new machines, overhauling and repairing defective or old quipment, building expanded work facilities, assisting backward work groups, and reorganizing work groups. For example, recently in the Shanghai No. 1 Machine Tool Plant, a technologically and politically advanced factory, a group of workers took such an initiative when they learned that a costly hobbing maching for making 6.3-meter gears was being imported. The group aroused other worker response by writing a wall poster indicating their resolve to design and produce an 8-meter gear hobbing machine and carry out "self-reliance"; they then received support from the plant's party committee. The design and building of this machine, the first made in China, was completed successfully in about four months and received wide publicity. Other examples amplify the point. In the Shanghai No.

2 Welding plant, on their own initiative, workers constructed workshops and built their own machines. They also undertook to help in new construction projects in the community. In the Hangzhou Combined Silk Dyeing and Printing Plant, workers in a high-tension switch room repaired a boiler, giving great attention to insuring maximum safety in the refurbished unit with which they would work (Daily Report 1975c, 1975d; 1975e; 1975h; 1975l; Summary, 1975d).

CONCLUSION

Our account of the variety of ways in which Chinese factory workers participate in the management and decision-making of the entire factory environment is a qualitative presentation which only begins to identify and define the expanding roles that workers, technicians, and managerial personnel carry out. We have been introduced to the administrative, organizational, and human practices which are being experimented with as the Chinese people—in their varied production and civic functions—are being led toward and exposed to widely trumpeted Maoist goals and values. The setting for shaping a new kind of modernized worker with different social relationships in his/her work group and among such groups has been sketched. The relationships in the factory environment, the motivational principles put into operation, and the major production goals around which personnel are organized have also been outlined.

Whatever the degree and quality of worker participation actually are, it is clear that workers have a variety of formal and informal means for affecting and sharing in factory decisions and for generating some input determining the quality of their work environment. Opportunities exist for: criticism of policies and practices, direct voice in certain kinds of decisions, representation on governing bodies, input in creating new products and services, a voice and role in advancing skills and education, becoming more active in different work tasks, exchanging technical know-how with other units, exercising initiatives in many

areas so that self-realization possibilities may open up as the factory itself develops technically and socially. Thus workers are involved in some way in the decisions of what and how much is to be produced, how the production process is carried out, what and how new technology is introduced, what and how technical training is to be developed, and how the factory environment (including housing, health care, education) is shaped and modified.

Ideally, our description should be supplemented with empirical data on the extent of worker participation in China. Some quantitative notion of the areas in which participation and decision-making occur, the number of interactions, the length of time of participation behaviors, and other indicators of participation would help to judge how meaningful a part of workers' lives and factory operations the participation that we have described really is (Obradovric, 1975). Though we cannot provide such data or even speculate meaningfully on probable orders of magnitude of the extent and intensity of worker participation, some reflections, based on reading the literature, visiting several Chinese factories in 1973, and discussing with recent visitors to factories, are offered to help see the process of Chinese worker participation as an important developing phenomenon with significant implications for the realization of new kinds of social relations in industry.

It is likely that the mechanisms we have described exist in some measure in almost all state-operated factories. In some of these an array of such mechanisms is in operation, and these factories are held before the public and party cadres as models to be emulated. The experimentation that leads to successful outcomes is elaborately publicized and such outcomes become examples to be tried out by cadres in their own factories. But the importance of the publicity is not so much to provide models, though that is one purpose, as to reinforce the style of social relations to be cultivated in factories and to encourage the development of other successful models functionally related to the concrete situations in particular plants.

As to the extent of worker involvement, undoubtedly in most factories only a minority of workers are now active participators.

This has been Mao's starting assumption with the expectation that over time, as class struggle proceeds, the level and extent of activism will expand. The recent campaign extending "proletarian dictatorship" with worker theory study groups galvanized to struggle against "bourgeois right" was calculated to achieve, among other goals, higher levels of activism on the part of rank-and-file workers and peasants. Linking such campaigns to new collective institutions is one effective way to heighten, perpetuate, and spread activism.

In those factories where "bourgeois right" is still very strong and cadres carry on in the tradition of old-style management, it is quite probable that worker participation is more a slogan than a reality. Since such factories still exist by Chinese accounts, the unevenness of worker participation as a reality in much of China must be taken as a fact. In a sense this is only one facet of the perennial problem of proportionate development in a country as large, diverse, and unevenly fashioned as China is.

Other problems, beyond degree of activism, exist. One arises from continued existence in factories of temporary or contract workers as well as apprentices who do not enjoy the perquisites of regular workers (Hoffmann, 1974: 68-70). Temporary workers have suffered wage inequities and insecure employment in the past and also did not enjoy pensions, free medical care, and sickness and maternity leave privileges. There has been no indication, in this writer's reading of the literature, that such workers play a role in the mechanisms of worker participation. Whether this arises from inadvertent omission in reports, disinclination of a "pariah" group to work closely with the regular, "favored" workers, or calculated exclusion of the group in new worker-participation processes is not known. In any event, the existence of such workers in the face of the claim that workers are "masters" of their factories represents a contradiction that qualifies appreciably positive results of workers participation (Milton, 1976: 186-190).

Another problem is wages. Since 1956 there has been no overall increase in workers' wages in order to keep the gap in incomes between workers and peasants from widening. In 1963

and the early 1970s, workers in the lowest wage grades were given small wage increases by being promoted generally one grade. Though consumer prices have been contained and in some instances reduced, workers at the lower wage grades (¥35-¥45 a month) have undoubtedly felt pinched. Discontentment of this sort as well as general desire for more income have probably been major factors in the pressure for increased wages (sometimes briefly successful) and the outbreak of numerous strikes and other labor disorders in 1974 and 1975 in steel, mining, transport, and other industries. Widespread worker discontent at a time when worker participation in management and decision-making was so prominently hailed as evidence of spreading new social relations in industrial plants certainly raises questions about the efficacy of the new processes and roles (Hoffmann, 1974: 154-156; 144-150; Milton, 1976: 375; New York Times, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d; U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1976).

Another problem that reflects on the results of worker participation is the inadequacy of safety mechanisms and procedures in many factories. Though much emphasis has been placed by the CCP and trade unions on labor protection in plants, and Chinese medical practice has devoted many human and material resources to perfecting surgical techniques of rejoining severed limbs and of restoring burned tissue (many severed limbs and burns resulting from industrial accidents), the level of safety procedures and worker consciousness is often quite poor. To the extent that such a state of affairs exists in a plant where worker participation has been cultivated and developed, that plant and its leadership have failed to meet a major requirement of improved social relations and worker welfare (Hoffmann, 1974: 140-142).

The definition of worker participation in China is still in the making. Constraints exist on the kinds of decisions workers, and cadres for that matter, can make and how far they can go. Actions which conflict with fundamental policies or reintroduce "capitalistic" practices are vigorously opposed and are strongly dealt with when discovered. In the resolution of such "non-antagonistic" conflicts, great efforts are made to subject the

workers and cadres involved to heavy doses of ideological education. While anything remotely suggesting "antagonistic" conflicts (e.g., counterrevolutionary activity) is summarily dealt with, where party and trade union cadres have mishandled worker grievances or have not prepared workers adequately to accept constraints considered necessary, the recalcitrant workers are not usually punitively treated, but are engaged in extended criticism and political education sessions.

The actual range and meaning of decisions open to management and thus workers is limited in various ways. Output of key products is set by central planners and, though worker and management input is required, the initiative for decision-making is at the center. For many products, however, decisions as to output can be made by management subject to vertical and horizontal outside influence and perhaps veto in some circumstances. In those instances where management initiative and power in decision-making is primary, the reality of worker participation will be a function of plant politics. One important criterion of the significance of worker participation, once management's powers are defined, is the extent to which worker participation occurs in the most important management functions such as quota management, planning (short-term to long-range), and grievance procedures. The right to meaningful worker involvement in significant decision-making mandates corollary responsibilities. The serious discharge of such rights and responsibilities must have a major effect on social relations within the plant. For example, genuine worker participation in quota management, which necessarily involves a thorough understanding of short- and long-range cost, profit, wage, and investment, is incompatible with material incentive schemes as primary mechanisms for increased worker productivity. In fact, genuine worker involvement on a broad scale reinforces intrinsic motivation as the worker becomes a political economist.

Future effective evaluation of the true quality of worker participation in China must deal not only with the degree and quality of worker participation, but also with certain kinds of changes in the work environment and in attitudes and behaviors

not only of workers but also of cadres and technicians. We must be able to gauge whether workers are involved in ever increasing numbers in decisions and managerial processes that affect the most important aspects of work and its supporting social structures; we must also be able to discern whether workers and technicians are sensitive to the quality of work conditions and are able to improve those conditions when they find them unsatisfactory.

Thus, the qualitative evidence we have reviewed gives us some sense of how the Chinese leaders see the workers' role in the process of revolutionary modernization that is expected to lead to communism. Participation in factory decision-making processes is a mandatory requirement of the collectivist style of work and living. We now just begin to see the outlines of what worker participation is to mean: clearly, workers' participatory roles must be major elements in the entire production process if the social relations of communism are to develop.

That these newly defined and evolving roles for workers are integral parts of Maoist policy with enormous significance for ideological and socioeconomic objectives is patent. The success of effective worker (and citizen) participation is absolutely essential for the realization of the ultimate goal of communism. The Maoists have burned their bridges behind them so far as folowing Soviet paths: either a "new" revolutionary person participating actively in all facets of life is created or "revisionism" will take over. A collective, egalitarian work ethos in which self-realization on the job and psychic recompense in terms of fulfilling work and life experiences (internalizing the values of service to the people, self-reliance, simple, austere material satisfaction, and so on) must be effective if the workers are to play their revolutionary role in shaping communism. Worker participation must be seen, thus, as an essential part of the process of class struggle that Maoists maintain must underlie progress toward communism and shape more and more workers with revolutionary consciousness and work style.

NOTES

1. The author and colleagues visiting China in 1973 received this impression directly in conversations and less directly in observations at several major points in the country. One story told the author by a colleague of Chinese ancestry who visited his family in 1972 illustrates the point. His sister, now an engineer, keeps her old worker's card as a sign of former status.

2. These data were gathered by the author in July 1973 in a visit to the Beijing plant.

3. The Yuan is now given a value of about U.S. $.52 in China.

4. The information on the Shanghai Tube Plant was obtained by the writer in July 1973 when he visited the plant. Since the Cultural Revolution, salaries in China for high-level personnel have been kept down. In July 1975 Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-ping disclosed to a group of Japanese journalists that his salary, at the top of salary levels, was ¥400 (over $210) a month, a level of income paid to about 100 persons in China. The vice premier also indicated that the next lower income level, ¥300 a month, was received by only several thousand officials. The high incomes were constrasted with the ¥60 a month average income for Chinese workers and the vice-premier indicated that the gap was still too great.

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