Race and Class in Chinese Historiography: Divergent Interpretations of Zhang Bing-lin and Anti-Manchuism in the 1911 Revolution

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Divergent Interpretations of Zhang Bing-lin and Anti-Manchuism in the 1911 Revolution

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When the Manchus came [to China] they killed our ancestors, violated our women, occupied the territory of Han race, made their vile, comtemptible race into a noble class, for generations enfeoffed kings and what's more sent some of their base race to be stationed in strategic spots in each of the provinces which they called garrisons, and they guarded us Han people as one would guard thieves—this was indeed despicable, and still they craved to be parasites! In addition the covetous and greedy officials they loosed upon us collect and levy [exhorbitant] taxes for them, and thus disappointment and sorrow is reaped; if what we have freely given them is not enough perhaps they will add a penalty or deprive us of our lives. Furthurmore, until now with the imperial principles in a state of anarchy, they only look after the foreigners, and give us up to the foreigners to act as third class slaves. In addition, as for our land, today one piece is severed and given away to this [foreign country]; tomorrow another piece will be cut off and given away to that [foreign country]. . . . Therefore our revolution first must revenge our ancestors and secondly must be planned quickly in order to avoid the extinction of our decendants; how much more then is this a glorious and true cause?!

—from the Gongjinhui Manifesto[1]

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Zhang Bing-lin (Tai-yan, 1869-1936) has received but scant scholarly treatment in the West. Aside from several chapters in Michael Gasster's *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911,* the only article length essay on Zhang in a Western language is A. M. Grigor'iev's interesting piece, "Sotsial'no-politicheskiie idei Chzhan Tai-iania v period podgotovki Sin'khaiskoi revoliutsii" (The sociopolitical thought of Zhang Tai-yan in the period just before the Revolution of 1911). There are, though, good reasons for the lack. Zhang wrote in an extremely obtuse classical style—perversely so—with numerous Western and Buddhist influences, all of which make his writings exceedingly difficult to penetrate. He was among the great classical scholars of his day and a leader of the old-text school, and his works are replete with dozens of elusive *guwen* references. One willingly calls to mind Lu Xun's comment: "I could not even punctuate the sentences let alone understand the theme; and the same was true of many young people in those days" (Lu, 1956, 4: 166). However, in the People's Republic of China (and in Japan), Zhang has been the subject of many studies, even more than Sun Yat-sen. It is a tribute to the depth of his ideas and the complexity of his thought that no single picture emerges from a reading of contemporary Chinese historiography on Zhang; in fact, no two or three pictures emerge. Until the Cultural Revolution, and again, somewhat recently the debate over Zhang Bing-lin's place in history, especially with respect to the 1911 Revolution, raged hotly. In no other historiographical debate in China that I have studied have there been so many sides and such diversity of opinion.

The writing of history always involves the values and political views of the historian, and in a state and society as politicized as China, historiography is serious business.[2] It can encompass such critical definitions as of the national identity and of the basis of political legitimacy. In this essay I shall examine the analytic ingredients of contemporary Chinese historiography concerning the status of Zhang Bing-lin (and several of his contemporaries for comparative purposes) and the place of anti-Manchuism in their thought. The central categories of analysis are the roles played by "race" as opposed to "class" as motive forces in history which encourage revolution; the resolution of this issue is funda-

mental to a Marxist historiography. As a multiethnic society in the throes of "development," China presents her historians of the 1911 Revolution with a difficult task. There is no question but that they are all Marxists, making use of class analysis as the primary investigative tool, but they are also confronted with this trying problem of anti-Manchuism. What is the class basis of this anti-Manchu ideology? How can it best be understood as an historical phenomenon?

ON ZHANG BING-LIN

Why is Zhang Bing-lin such a crucial figure for Chinese historians? While we can only conjecture an answer to this important question, it seems that several significant characteristics of the man are immediately apparent. Zhang's life spans the late Qing and early Republican period and he came into contact with all the major currents of thought, East and West, of those times. In many ways the contradictions and antimonies in his ideas reflect the confusion and groping of the age.[3] His stubbornness, nonconformity, and general negativism stand as a curious index of the times; one often reads the perhaps apocryphal account of his grandfather reading the young Zhang of Wang Fu-zhi and Gu Yan-wu, the late Ming anti-Manchu intellectual giants who refused to serve the alien Qing court, and of Zhang choosing the *hao* Tai-yan out of respect of Gu and similarly refusing to sit for Manchu administered examinations. Unlike many of his revolutionary contemporaries, it seems that, despite his virulent anti-Manchuism, Zhang was concerned with more than the extirpation of the Manchu race. He regarded their destruction as primary, but he considered and wrote about socioeconomic issues as well. In conjunction with the *pi-Lin pi-Kong* (criticize-Lin criticize-Confucius) campaign in recent years, Zhang has been partially resuscitated in China as an early outspoken anti-Confucianist and opponent of the deifier of Confucius, Kang You-wei (Shen, 1973; Ching, 1974).

While perhaps not as successful at identifying the interconnections of the multiple strains in Zhang's thought with his particu-

larly venomous, obsessive anti-Manchuism, as have some Japanese authors,[4] scholars in China have made important advances. With the help of an article by Cai Shang-si, I have been able to distinguish 10 (or possibly 11) different views in the overall literature on Zhang. However, if we look critically at these various positions, with attention to the issue of anti-Manchuism and class background, these 10 views can be boiled down to three major questions around which the great debate over Zhang Bing-lin seems to have focused.[5] They are: (a) What class viewpoint does Zhang's thought reflect? (b) Is his anti-Manchuism solely racialist[6] or is it significantly diluted with bourgeois democratic or peasant democratic strains? (c) In the final analysis, is Zhang's thought in the 1911 period to be assessed as progressive or reactionary?

Not only does the first question find Chinese Marxist scholars who subscribe to one of three classes—landlord (or gentry), peasant (or petty bourgeoisie), and bourgeoisie (or bourgeois democratic)—but all possible combinations of these three also find support. For example, Luo Yao-jiu (1960: 76) describes Zhang Bing-lin as a "political representative of the anti-Manchu, racialist, landlord-gentry class" who are regarded as fundamentally antibourgeois democratic; and the famous historian Liu Da-nian, in a much publicized essay (1962: 196-197), singles out Zhang Bing-lin and his ilk as "the landlord anti-Manchu clique" or, defined more fully (if at the expense of clarity), "the embourgeoised feudal rulers in alliance with the bourgeois revolutionary group";[7] however, Li Shi-yue (1959: 17, 19) regards Zhang's views as reflective of a peasant viewpoint and certainly not of the landlords'; Zhang Wei-xun (writing specifically in rebuttal to Luo Yao-jiu; Xiamen daxue xuebao 2, 1960 in Cai, 1962: 58-59) and Zhu Zhong-yu (in a short book on Zhang Bing-lin; Zhang Tai-yen 1961 in Cai, 1962: 59) both see Zhang as a bourgeois democratic revolutionary who, in Zhu's words, "degenerated into a reactionary." One curious admixture of these views was articulated in an apparently anonymous article in the Shanghai newspaper *Wenhuibao:* "Put simply—he was neither a representative of the peasant petty bourgeoisie nor the anti-Manchu landlord clique, as neither classification fully expresses

his thought" (Cai, 1962: 58; see also Xia, 1962: 312, for a similar view); this inability to assign a class basis to Zhang's thought and the fact that the article is unsigned may not be coincidental. Still further, the eminent Chinese historian of philosophy, Hou Wai-lu, (1947: 855-857) cites Zhang as a supporter of direct democracy as over parliamentary methods and, hence,"a peasant democratic thinker"; in a more thorough analysis, the team of Hu Sheng-wu and Jin Chong-ji essentially concur with Hou that Zhang took his place with the broad masses of the Chinese people, the peasantry (Hu and Jin, 1962b: 323-324, 326). Cai Shang-si (1962: 59-60, 67-69), an esteemed scholar and bitter critic of traditional Chinese thought, tends toward placing Zhang's ideas with those of the "reactionary landlords," but Cai also sees in Zhang's thought reflections of pleasant and even bourgeois demands of a progressive nature; but he firmly disagrees with the "peasant democratic thinker" analysis and the "bourgeois democratic revolutionary" assessment. Finally, a persuasive view is taken by Ahao Jin-yu (1961: 31-32) who sees Zhang's thought and class affiliations as changeable: in the 1898 reform period Zhang is described as "bourgeois reformist"; in the "period of fermentation" prior to the 1911 Revolution, Zhang becomes "a bourgeois democratic revolutionary"; but, after 1911, he reverts to "bourgeois reformism." Zhao is critical of scholars, such as Cai Shang-si, for applying Zhang's post-1911 views to the pre-1911 period in order to prove that Zhang was of the landlord class; he attacks Luo Yao-jiu for "only discussing the feudal backward side [of Zhang's thought] and not his progressive side."

While the responses to this first question of Zhang's class affiliations do not necessarily contribute to our understanding either of contemporary Chinese scholarship or of Zhang Binglin, they do point to considerable historiographical leeway which was apparently accesible to Chinese historians as well as to the liveliness of the scholarly world. No historian abandons class analysis as a primary tool, but this great divergence of opinion and the intellectual hedging over where to place Zhang indicate a lack of dogma in the application of class analysis and a remarkable creativity in its usage by certain scholars.

The second question is fundamental not only for an explication of different interpretations of Zhang Bing-lin, but for an understanding of Chinese assessments of anti-Manchuism in general. Approximately half of the Chinese historians who comment sufficiently to be included in this group argue that Zhang's anti-Manchuism was thoroughly racialist or racial revengist *(zhongzu fu-chou).* One unfortunate translation problem presents itself here: while all authors generally use the expressions *fan-Man* or *pai-Man* to mean anti-Manchu, there is confusion over the difference between the terms *minzu* (people, nation, race) and *zhongzu* (race; Lin Yao-hua, 1963: 175, 189; see also Wei, 1956). Dictionaries are of little help as they distinguish too sharply between the two terms, which obviously have a large area of overlap. Only Morohashi Tetsuji's *Dai Kan-Wa jiten* indicates the possibility of overlap in meaning (Morohashi, 1957-1960, 6: 841, 8: 601; Zhang Qi-yun, 1967, 18: 7774, 24: 10508; Ci-hai, 1936, I *(chen-ji):* 269, II *(wu-ji):* 242). As mentioned earlier, I shall take *zhongzu* and *zhongzuzhuyi* as race and racialist, respectively; where *minzu* and *minzuzhuyi* seem to have the same connotations, I will use the same English translations and place the Chinese in parentheses. This group who see the sum total of Zhang's thought to be anti-Manchu racialism include the highly respected scholars, Cai Shang-si and Liu Da-nian. Similarly, Zhang Nan and Wang Ren-zhi (1963: 6) refer to Zhang Bing-lin as the creator of an entire program based on anti-Manchu racialism and racial revenge, as "restoration of Han supremacy. . . and overturning the Qing dynasty constituted the only goals of the revolution" for him. Li Shi-yue (1959: 17, 19), on the other hand, is highly critical of Zhang Bing-lin's racialist language and his great Han chauvinism, but he holds that Zhang was not a racial revenger; for beneath the seamy veneer of racialism Zhang is said to have tied together political and social questions. Zhang Wei-xun essentially agrees with this reasoning and sees Zhang Bing-lin's theory of racial revolution *(zhongzu geming)* and his attitude toward liberation from semifeudal and semicolonial bondage as consistent with Sun Yat-sen's "nationalist spirit" (Cai, 1962: 58-59). A number of writers regard the anti-Manchu slogan as essentially a rallying call or ideological weapon to gain support;

in a volume on the history of modern Chinese thought, this point is made with respect to Zhang as follows: "The most powerful weapon in this early period of opposition to the Manchus' feudal tyranny was precisely the democratic thought of opposing the foreign racial oppression of the Manchus" (Shi et al., 1957: 94-95). Hou Wai-lu (1947: 855), too, does not divine from Zhang's theory of racial revolution that he was a "narrow racialist," but rather the author of a "program for democratic action."Wang Wei-cheng's essay on Zhang also sees virtually no racialism in his anti-Manchuism. He states that the object of anti-Manchuism was the establishment of a "mass republic *(hezhong gonghe)* and democratic government." Zhang is said to have pressed his attack on the Manchus in order to discredit their sham reforms and the support of them by Kang You-wei and the constitutional monarchists. Further evidence that Zhang was not a narrow racialist lies in his call to expel the highly placed Han servants of the Manchu aristocracy—"His theory of anti-Manchu revolution at that time only represented a most suitable slogan for the democratic revolution" (Wang Wei-cheng, 1958: 142-149). Wang goes so far as to say that even when Zhang wrote in support of racial revolution, he intended no racialism.

One of the best analyses of Zhang's anti-Manchuism comes from Hu Sheng-wu and Jin Chong-ji who see anti-Manchuism as the most vibrant and explosive element of Zhang's thought. That anti-Manchu revolution could become so potent an idea not only for Zhang but for vitually all participants in the revolutionary activities of the 1911 period has two explanations, according to Hu and Jin. First, it developed from traditional racialist thought by reviving the memories of Manchu atrocities in the years at the end of the Ming; they cite an historical basis here for Chinese "racialist hatred" *(minzu chouhen)* of their Manchu aristocratic rulers. Second, and more important, say Hu and Jin with specific reference to Zhang Bing-lin, anti-Manchuism, in calling for the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, exprssed a fear of national partition by imperialists which the Qing was incapable of preventing and a fear of potential racial annihilation. In Zhang's political thought, "anti-Manchuism was anti-imperialism, in reality" (Hu and Jin, 1962b: 323-324). Hu and Jin then explain the process by

which Zhang came to see the Manchus as puppets of the imperialists. They recognize the strain of great Han chauvinism in Zhang's thought but do not concede its overriding importance. Many other Chinese scholars would scoff at this appraisal by asking why, if Zhang was as aware of the imperialist danger as Hu and Jin believe, why did he not clearly express antiimperialist demands and only speak to the issue of anti-Manchuism. Hu and Jin implicitly respond to this hypothetical question that Zhang thought the Manchus had to be removed before a concerted anti-imperialist struggle could be launched. Hu and Jin, though, criticize Zhang for not raising the two issues simultaneously, at least at the sloganeering level.

One particularly astute analysis of Zhang Bing-lin's anti-Manchuism is presented by Tang Zhi-jun. Tang is one of the few Chinese historians who recognizes Zhang's staunch support of the old-text school, in contrast to Kang You-wei's emphasis on *Gongyang* interpretations of the *Spring and Autumn Annals,* as a fundamental source of his anti-Manchuism and his opposition to constitutional monarchy (Tang, 1964: 41). It was, after all, the *Zuozhuan* which clearly stated: "If he be not of our kin, he is sure to have a different mind." Similarly, Zhao Jin-yu argues the necessity of dealing with Zhang's work holistically so that his anti-Manchuism becomes considerably more complex than mere racial revenge. Zhao's attempt to play down the racialist content of Zhang's anti-Manchuism and to stress its antiautocratic base resembles Wang Wei-cheng's work. Unlike Wang, Zhao regards Zhang's anti-Manchuism as severly infected with great Han chauvinism, but not totally so. Zhao recognizes, as do Hu and Jin, that Zhang saw the need to oppose imperialism through opposition to the Qing. Fearing the Chinese to be too weak, Zhang called for a concentration of energies against the Manchus. Whereas the "anti-Manchu landlord clique" sought only to oust the Manchus, Zhang had transcended this position in his appeals for popular sovereignty, national *(minzu)* independence, and anti-despotism. Again Zhao criticizes Cai for dubbing Zhang's numerous historical and philosophical examples as reactionary and supportive of a feudal restoration. Zhao argues that Zhang only referred so frequently to the past as a means of instill-

ing in his Chinese readers a sense of national pride, a consciousness of their glorious past and the depravity of their position under the Manchus. Clearly Zhang did not like everything in the Chinese tradition, but followed a policy of "selecting what is right and dispensing with what is wrong" *(qushi shefei)* (Zhao, 1961: 33-42, 46).

Only the best historians seem prepared to take a stand over our third question, the progressive or reactionary nature of Zhang's thought in the 1911 period. Hu Sheng-wu and Jin Chong-ji agree with Wang Wei-cheng (and with A. M. Grigor'iev and several Japanese historians) that Zhang Bing-lin's effect in and import to the 1911 period must be characterized as progressive. All of them see his anti-Manchuism as essentially progressive because it served to awaken many Chinese to the political and social evils perpetrated by the Qing authorities. As Ren Ji-yu states (1970: 579-580), "By making use of racial and cultural differences, he tried to prove that the Han race should not be ruled by a foreign race." Thus, anti-Manchuism, by itself a reactionary racialist creed, was turned into a progressive force in Zhang's usage because it stimulated revolution. It was the most potent ideology for organizing secret society members into the revolutionary ranks, and here Zhang's central role is often cited (e.g., Lai, 1956: 15). However, the three most prominent opponents of regarding Zhang Bing-lin as progressive (Liu Da-nian, Tang Zhi-jun, and Cai Shang-si), all believe that the fundamentally reactionary core of his thought principally arose from the backwardness of his traditionalism and the venality of his anti-Manchu racialism. For them anti-Manchuism served to obscure the central issues of feudalism and imperialism, and though anti-Manchuism may have been a muted cry of social protest against these evils, it remained stifled beyond its capacity to confront and combat the problems of the day.

In 1961 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, over 100 Chinese historians gathered at a conference in Wuhan to discuss the problems of 1911. The rapporteurs recorded the conclusions of the papers presented and indicated that debate raged. Apparently there were as many as three papers on Zhang Bing-lin submitted, but because of space limitations

and for the sake of convenience, only the piece by Hu Sheng-wu and Jin Chong-ji was included in the collection of essays published by the conference. From the editing of the conference papers and the arguments that arose in workshops, three positions on Zhang are said to have been voiced. One group of scholars initially remarked that Zhang's writings are extremely difficult to read; they contain feudal as well as bourgeois and even rural small producer elements, radical as well as conservative points, enlightened and backward aspects. They regarded Zhang's anti-Manchuism as principally antimonarchical, that is opposition to the Manchu imperial house, Manchu officialdom, and the Han Chinese who served them. In their view Zhang's anti-Manchuism was by no means intended as a call for the wholesale annihilation of the Manchu people. Of course, this group of scholars did perceive traces of a concept of "distinguishing Chinese and barbarian" in Zhang's thought, yet they insisted on the essentially modern, democratic core of his thought, a far cry from "feudal, narrow racialism." This group's genuine confusion over Zhang's thought is nowhere more apparant than when they attempted to place him in a class. On the one hand, his opposition to the feudal aristocracy and the bourgeois representative system were said to derive from the position of the landowning class. On the other hand, Zhang opposed the feudal land system and called for the abolition of the institution of landlordism, and thus represented interests and demands of the plebeian masses, the peasantry. This group summarized the political aspects of Zhang's thought in three basic points: (a) anti-Manchu revolution; (b) "a government run by commoners"; and (c) equalization of rich and poor (Hubeisheng, 1962b: 703-705).

From the summary of their position, the second group of scholars at Wuhan seem no less confused. They argued that although Zhang was influenced by "enlightened Western bourgeois scholars who had a democratic proclivity," still his thought reflects a position representative of the rural petty bourgeoisie. In a feat of scholarly legerdemain, this group also tied Zhang's thought to the "landlord anti-Manchu clique." How? On one hand, Zhang's distaste for parliamentarism indicates an anti-

bourgeois attitude characteristic of the peasantry. On the other hand, his sympathy with the peasantry and advocacy of their cause both was intended as a warning to exploiters lest the peasants rise, and was deeply influenced by his Confucian education with its "feudal landlord tinge." Thus, they saw Zhang's "sympathy for the peasantry and his hatred of merchants" (capitalists) as "feudal despotic thought" (Hubeisheng, 1962b: 706-707).

There was a third group of scholars who saw both democratic and feudal elements in Zhang's thought, and argued that neither "peasant petit bourgeois representative" nor "landlord anti-Manchu representative" were fitting appelations for Zhang, as both fail to express the full picture (Hubeisheng, 1962b: 707).

Let us now take a brief look at the assessments of Chinese historians of several other revolutionaries from the 1911 period in order to compare treatments of anti-Manchuism and revolutionism.

ON SUN YAT-SEN

Divergence of opinion concerning Sun Yat-sen's anti- Manchuism does exist, but it is difficult to pinpoint. The usual procedure of an author is to refer to the first tenet ("Extirpate the Tartar Slaves") of the Xingzhonghui and Tongmenghui manifestoes or to the first of his Three Principles of the People, the Principle of Nationalism *(minzuzhuyi);* the author then states whether or not he finds anti-Manchu racialism embedded within. Duan Chang-tong, in an essay on the 1911 Revolution written in 1952, holds the view that Sun's minzuzhuyi was solely anti-Manchu in content and not antiimperialist (1952: 34-35). Chen Xu-lu takes a different position: Sun had made it clear that his minzuzhuyi was not a principle of "racial revenge" for in its opposition to Qing government, it contained a core of antidespotism. Moreover, Chen objects to the view that Sun's first principle was limited to anti-Manchuism (1955: 32-33). Yuan Shu-yi argues a compromise view: "at first, anti-Manchuism was the center of the Principle of Nationalism," and "the national revolution *(minzu*

geming) emanated from racialism. . . . The key to anti-Manchuism was struggling to take 'political power,' that is overthrowing the Manchu government and establishing 'a country of the race' " *(minzu de guojia).* Yuan argues that when Sun focused his first principle on the fight for power and national independence, he "dispensed with feudalistic, pure racial revengism." Yet the greatest failure of Sun's minzuzhuyi was its lack of a direct confrontation with the imperialist powers so as to effect a genuinely independent program (Yuan, 1955: 22). Most Chinese authors see a fuller expression of the bourgeois political program in the Tongmenghui principles than in the anti-Manchu program of such men as Zhang Bing-lin and Zou Rong (e.g., Wang Renchen, 1962: 272-273). No author sees any merit in Sun's capricious dealings with the foreigners. Li Shu is especially critical of Sun's (and the Chinese capitalists') view that only the Manchus obstructed the blossoming of capitalist competition in China. Li calls this "utterly immature . . . in reality it happened to be the opposite" (1954: 59).

Chen Xi-qi's work, *Tongmenghui chengli qian de Sun Zhongshan* (Sun Yat-sen before the founding of the Tongmenghui), is by far the best work produced on Sun in China. Chen is critical of Sun's early narrow concept of revolution which "only meant the overthrow of the rule of a foreign race and eradicationof the Qing government; that is, [the Xingzhonghui principles of] 'Extirpate the Tartar Slaves, Restore the Chinese Race' *(Hua-Xia)* was basically similar to the Heaven and Earth Society's idea of 'Overthrow the Qing, Revive the Ming' " (Chen Xi-qi, 1957: 16, 24, 30).[8] Chen then skillfully demonstrates how Sun Yat-sen's hatred of the Qing government expanded in its basis as Sun's reasons for despising the Qing became both more numerous and more incisive. Gradually Sun transcended simple anti-Manchu racialism. Chen cites Sun's kidnapping incident in London as the point at which he realized that in a world in which the "strong preyed on the weak" *(ruo-rou qiang-shi),* an alliance of all oppressed Asian peoples was needed and consequently he widened his scope beyond pure anti-Manchuism. Yet Chen strongly takes Sun and the Xingzhonghui to task for their behavior toward the Boxers. When the Boxers raised the call of "aid the Qing, destroy the

foreigners," the Xingzhonghui refused to cooperate because of their own parochial anti-Manchuism. Although Chen certainly sees drawbacks to the Boxer movement, it at least directed itself against the imperialists, whereas the Xingzhonghui and Sun Yat-sen would rather have cooperated with the imperialists to maintain their undiluted anti-Manchu attitude (Chen Xi-qi, 1957: 45-46, 57-58, 67). It is remarkable that a Chinese author would prefer to laud the millenialist Boxers over Sun Yat-sen, but the modern Chinese antiimperialist preoccupation appears to be stronger than allegiance to any individual, even Sun.[9] Although Sun receives favorable treatment at the hands of modern Chinese historians, it is not unqualified. Many scholarly works criticize the narrowness of his early ideas of nationalism and anti-Manchuism. Special distaste is reserved for Sun's dealings with the imperialists.

ON SONG JIAO-REN

Although it appears that little has been published in China concerning Song Jiao-ren, the summary of the 1961 conference in Wuhan indicates a controversy that surfaced over what sort of revolutionary Song was. In his essay on Song, Chen Xu-lu has little to say concerning anti-Manchuism save that "Song Jiao-ren very early engaged in revolutionary activities, and he was one who took the anti-Manchu national *(minzu)* revolution to guide his thought. From the anti-Manchu revolution, he developed toward democratic revolutionary thought" (Chen Xu-lu, 1962: 355).

Then what caused conflict at the fiftieth anniversary conference? Apparently either more papers were presented on Song at Wuhan than were published or Chen Xu-lu's essay gave rise to disagreements. According to the summation of differing opinions, questions arose as to whether or not Song was a "good bourgeois revolutionary," and whether or not he abandoned the progressive cause after the Wuchang Incident. Most of Chinese scholars agree that if one uses the "bourgeois democratic principle" as a mechanism for evaluation, Song Jiao-ren cannot com-

pare in revolutionary will with his compatriots, particularly after his "backsliding" (*daotui;* Hubeisheng, 1962b: 707-708).

The first group (a majority) who are antagonistic to Song answer the question, "Why did Song retreat from the revolutionary cause?", in four parts. They concede that Song opposed Japanese aggression against China, yet his antiimperialist attitude was not complete, as he approved of the false "neutrality" of England and the United States. He also never clearly expressed his view toward the program of the Tongmenghui. After the Revolution of 1911, Song is said to have wanted to continue the struggle in meetings and talks so as to enhance the development of capitalism. Such a position reveals his conversion from bourgeois revolutionary to bourgeois reformist. Generally this group assails Song's irreverent attitude toward the Tongmenghui leadership in general, and Sun Yat-sen in particular, and his neglect of the need to maintain unity within the Tongmenghui. This attitude is said to have had a bad effect on the revolution. Finally, when the Tongmenghui was reorganized into the Guomindang, Song is said to have allowed old bureaucratic officials to join en masse, which served to destroy the cohesiveness of the revolutionary camp (Hubeisheng, 1962b: 708).

In support of Song Jiao-ren, another group of scholars disagree with such a harsh treatment. They contradict the hostile majority on each point. They argue that Song was an anti-Manchu and a revolutionary who fought for democracy and was deeply idealistic in his objectives; none of this changed after the revolution—there was no backsliding. Song, reflecting the political trend of the times, is said to have believed fervently in the creation of a bourgeois democratic republic and to have fought for the ideals of the Tongmenghui. This group further argues that one cannot blame Song alone for the failures of the Tongmenghui reorganization. He had been active in their revolutionary work in the lower Yangzi valley and had been important to their cause. Finally, he is said never to have been duped by Yuan Shi-kai. The very fact that Yuan had him assassinated indicates Yuan's fear of Song and Song's cause (Hubeisheng, 1962b: 708-709).

The disagreement expressed at the Wuhan conference concerning Song Jiao-ren only applies to his perseverence in the revolutionary cause. Most Chinese scholars say he quit after 1911; some say he was true to the end. All retain the same standards of analysis—perceptions of imperialism, "thoroughness," hatred for Yuan Shi-kai, and so on. Whether or not Song is judged to have been a paragon of bourgeois revolutionary virtue will not severely shake the foundations of Chinese historiography. The conflicts exist, but they are surface disagreements, which, as we have seen, they were not in the argumentation over Zhang Bing-lin.

ON CHEN TIAN-HUA

Chinese historians discuss Chen Tian-hua (1875-1905) almost as a special case. Aside from the numerous references to the tremendous practical popularity of his writings, which in denunciation of the Qing stirred up the soldiers of the New Armies (e.g., Chen and Lao, 1962: 161), they see in Chen a most perceptive analyst of the dangers of imperialism. All critics cite antiimperialism as the nucleus of Chen's political philosophy and, as was not the case with Zhang Bing-lin, there seems to be little discord over Chen's place in history. Most authors regard his anti-Manchuism as a by-product of his hatred for the Powers, because the Qing's inability to function served the cause of imperialist encroachment (e.g., Yang, 1965: 21-25). As he eloquently stated it, the Qing court was not Manchu, but a "court of the foreigners" *(yangren de chaoting),* and the Manchus were but pawns. For this reason Chinese historians never describe Chen's anti-Manchuism as racialist. Chen did not neglect any of the basic historical reasons for anti-Manchuism and, in fact, indicted the Qing for all their atrocities, particularly for "their crimes of selling the nation away, their political corruption, and the extremity of their exploitation" (Sun, 1962: 383-384). Yet, his analysis avoided the pitfalls of great Han chauvinism and racialism.

Chen's shortcomings as a thinker and propagandist are the same as those of most other "bourgeois and petit bourgeois"

revolutionaries of the time. Chinese scholars especially criticize Chen on two counts. Although they appreciate the precociousness of his antiimperialism, they disagree fervently with his solution which called for an alliance of China and Japan, the yellow races, for the purpose of "mutual aid" in opposition to the European invasion of East Asia. Sun Zhi-fang decries this view as "immature, even wrong," but Sun recognizes his own position of historical hindsight and only castigates Chen in this instance for a "failure [common] to a bourgeois understanding during the period of the 1911 Revolution" (Sun, 1962: 390; Deng, 1959: 46). Races do not decide history; classes do. In this context we come to Chen Tian-hua's second major shortcoming. When he spoke of the group that would bolster the revolution, he referred to the "middle classes" *(zhongdeng shehui)* and not the peasant masses. Such conceptions of international alliances against imperialism and of domestic class configurations for revolution reveal, even in Chen, the lack of a thorough visualization of the essence of imperialism and feudalism (Shi et al., 1957: 100-102; Deng, 1959: 46).

The most scholarly and intelligent piece by a Chinese scholar on the thought of Chen Tian-hua was written by Chen Xu-lu and deserves individual attention. The merit of Chen Xu-lu's book lies in the extent to which he draws the lines of influence through Chen Tian-hua and in documenting the development of his anti-imperialism. The points the author makes do not necessarily add to those made by others, but they are far better supported and more interestingly presented. The author demonstrates that Chen Tian-hua's attacks on the Qing government went right to the heart of its corruption, its waste of money on personal luxuries, and its lack of support for the people who were starving; his view went beyond anti-Manchu racialism. He realized that not only must the "Manchu monarchical autocracy" be overthrown, but so also must any Han monarchy (1957: 49). Although the author finds fault with Chen Tian-hua for not displaying keen insight into the class conflicts of early twentieth-century China, the author does not expect such foresight on Chen's part. Chen died before class theory had any firm ground in China, and the author wisely asserts his own historical perspective over the circum-

stances he describes. For example, in dealing with Chen's concept of the "middle classes" as vanguard of the revolution, the author merely tells us that such a view is indicative of pre-Marxist pioneers who could not understand that the working class must lead the anticolonial revolution (p. 56). In conclusion, the author sees the same general problems with Chen Tian-hua's thought as with many other intellectuals of the same period: the lack of a thorough understanding of imperialism and feudalism. He says that Chen's ideas are similar to the eighteenth-century atheist materialist philosophers of revolutionary France (p. 60). In discussing the social ideas of Chen Tian-hua, Chen Xu-lu equates his ability to see the importance of reliance on the masses with his inability to be a class theorist. Chen is said to have drawn a clear distinction between rulers and ruled and even between "capitalists" and the masses, but he failed to comprehend the essence of bourgeois society. However, Chen Xu-lu makes the startlingly instructive remark for an orthodox Marxist that "in fact, if he was not a class theorist, then it is very hard to demand that he have a class concept of the masses" (p. 52). This is similar to an idea expressed by Feng You-lan concerning Confucius.

ON ZOU RONG

Zou Rong, the revolutionary prodigy who died in prison at the age of 20, has been the subject of a number of essays and two short books. Only one author, Chen Xu-lu again, has really dealt with Zou in depth or even analyzed any of his writings other than *The Revolutionary Army*. Numerous authors mention the immense popularity of this latter work and the stimulating effect it had on the revolution.

In modern Chinese scholarship. Zou has become a kind of paragon of the premodern revolutionary will personified. He is generally described as "a patriotic, democratic revolutionary" (Xiao, 1962: 8). In a children's book bearing his name as its title, which stands as a distillation of the Chinese understanding of Zou, he is presented as a young man whose main drive was opposition to Manchu feudal tyranny, but who failed to attack

imperialism, which was "tied up with feudalism," and thus failed to unite the "tasks of antiimperialism and antifeudalism." As his concept of minzuzhuyi was entirely anti-Manchu, it "did not distinguish the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty from the Manchu people," and it was "an anti-Manchuism of an arbitrarily narrow definition" (Liu and Xing, 1961: 20). Furthermore, the authors, Liu Ya-xue and Xing Lu-shen, criticize Zou for his inability to comprehend the power of the masses as the foundation of revolution. He shunned the Boxer movement and called for a "revolution in civilization" *(wenming geming).* However, all these shortcomings are inseparable from the general weaknesses of the bourgeoisie. Other works with pretention of appeal to a more scholarly audience repeat these very same criticisms of Zou (e.g., Shi et al., 1957: 98-99).

On the other hand, although Zou's anti-Manchuism as expressed in *The Revolutionary Army* typifies everything wrong with the narrow racialist view of the 1911 revolutionaries in Chinese authors' eyes, his spirit, his youthful vigor, and his dedication are pointed to as quintessential for an appreciation of the forces that led to revolution six years after his death. He is seen as a young man seriously in fear of the imminent extinction of the Chinese race by a barbarian ruling house (the Manchus) who severely oppressed his people (Wu Yu-jang, 1962: 61; Wang Ren-chen, 1962: 266, 270-271). Although his language was other than desirable, he still was a man who devoted his life to resisting oppression in favor of his confused ideal of democracy. In a 1958 edition of *The Revolutionary Army,* published in Shanghai, the readers are asked to forgive Zou's racialist language and to consider that his goal in writing this work was "to overthrow the feudal despotic Qing dynasty." Most significantly, Zou was "one of the representative personalities of the period of the old democratic revolution" (Zou, 1958: 1-2). Feng Zu-an goes even further to say that Zou's anti-Manchuism was not pure racialism but contained strong antifeudal and antiimperialist elements. He sees Zou's failures for all the same reasons as other Chinese scholars do, yet Feng hardly mentions Zou's virulent racialism at all (Feng, 1965).

Chen Xu-lu's book, to which we referred when discussing Chen Tian-hua, devotes its first half to an analysis of Zou Rong's views. As with Chen Tian-hua, Chen Xu-lu's section on Zou remains the best handling of Zou's thought in modern Chinese writings. Chen Xu-lu stresses throughout that Zou's "unshakable" revolutionary fervor served as a great impetus to a society "numbed" by years of oppression. In Zou's view of a "revolution in civilization," Chen identifies a dialectical destruction/construction motif which appears similar to Liang Qi-chao's. "Not only did he [Zou Rong] recognize that destruction was for construction, but, moreover, destruction itself contained construction" (Chen Xu-lu, 1957: 17-18). It was to be a revolution for the creation of civilization. Yet Chen is critical of Zou's excluding from consideration the participation of the masses in his "revolution in civilization."

Chen sees antidespotism and antifeudalism as the major sources of Zou's anti-Manchuism. In response to the Qing's racial oppression of the Chinese and their establishment of authority, the development of a "racial pride" *(minzu qijie)* in Zou began to focus on the Manchus. Hence all the "correct" socioeconomic linkages between antifeudalism, the peasantry's dire predicament on the land, and a mass movement all escape Zou's revolutionary strategy. Only the despicable Manchus remain as the object of invective. "This is without a doubt the limitation of the democratic revolutionary thought of *The Revolutionary Army*" (Chen Xu-lu, 1957: 20). Chen is more willing than other scholars to credit Zou with a consciousness of the imperialist threat to China. If the Manchus continued to sell China away to the foreign powers, China would soon cease to exist; the only road in Zou's eyes was Manchu extermination ("destroy the five million furry Manchus"). Antifeudalism brought Zou to antiimperialism, argues Chen, but he never fully confronted the antiimperialist task.

By constructing the problem in this way, Chen identifies the core of Zou's thought in his anti-Manchuism, and in anti-Manchuism Chen sees various conflicting forces and tensions. Zou's vision is still limited by all the shortcomings of the bourgeois revolutionary and anti-Manchu racialist; however, "the

democratic revolutionary thought and strugglings of Zou Rong will always occupy a glorious page in modern Chinese history" (Chen Xu-lu, 1957: 36). Chen Xu-lu's work on Zou not only surpasses all other modern Chinese work on Zou in quality, it surpasses all Western work as well. Chen awakens us to the central issues and points of internal conflict in the thought of Zou Rong. He handles most sensitively the issue of anti-Manchuism and its role in Zou's ideas.

IMPERIALISM AND FEUDALISM

Generally speaking, in dealing with the Revolution of 1911, modern Chinese historians are to an extent didactic, but their genuine concern usually transcends pure dogmatism. The general framework from which all the historians begin, following Mao's lead, is that late Qing China suffered critically on two fronts *(neiluan waihuan)*. Domestically, the despotic Manchu rulers and their local henchmen, the landlord class (composed mainly of Han Chinese), enforced an oppressive *feudal* yoke on the Chinese masses. Externally, the *imperialist* powers, since their success in the Opium Wars and their expansion in the wake of the liquidation of the Boxer Uprising, were "nibbling and gulping" Chinese territory; the Manchus served only as their intermediaries ("running dogs" in Mao's terminology). As the twentieth century opened, the two ogres of feudalism and imperialism stood before the Chinese people. The lasting value of a person's ideas from this period is usually based on the thoroughness of his perception and understanding of feudalism and imperialism; and certain historians are able to adapt this framework to fine creative ends.

With respect to anti-Manchuism in particular, Zhang Nan and Wang Ren-zhi, in their fascinating introduction to a book of documents from the first decade of this century, delineate three gradations of anti-Manchuism. The most virulent, vociferous anti-Manchu advocates, some of whom called for the wholesale slaughter of the Manchus, constitute the first of these groups. Such men as Wu Yue and Zhang Bing-lin are said to exemplify this narrow attitude of extreme anti-Manchuism, also referred to

as racial revengist (Zhang and Wang, 1963: 6, 14). All modern Chinese historians criticize this brand of anti-Manchuism for a variety of reasons, including its connotation of great Han chauvinism and reactionary racialism. Chen Xu-lu criticizes this as "petit bourgeous revolutionary fanaticism" when it surfaces in Zou Rong's thought (Chen Xu-lu, 1957: 22). However, this extremist wing of the revolutionary movement is generally commended, in terms which are virtually moralistic, for its revolutionary devotion. Thus Zou Rong is a kind of premodern Maoist model hero.

Zhang's and Wang's second classification of anti-Manchuism is of a less racialist and more antidynastic slant. Zhu Zhi-xin and many others are listed among its advocates. They are said to be primarily antidespotic and democratic inasmuch as they sought to expel the Manchus first and all heinous government second. This group basically argued the incompatibility of the Han and Manchu peoples under any form of government (1963: 6) However, their objectives in overthrowing the Qing dynasty went beyond the pure racialism of the first group.

The third group did not primarily stress their anti-Manchuism, but conceived of it as part of a larger political program in which the overthrow of the Qing dynasty was but one element They are not characterized by racialism or racial revenge; they basically opposed despotism and wanted to establish a republic (Zhang and Wang, 1963: 7). Such men as Chen Tian-hua, who most clearly perceived the true enemy to be imperialism, with the Manchus are mere henchmen, are classified in this group. One would suspect that some Chinese scholars would place Sun Yat-sen in this last category, but Sun presents a serious difficulty, and usually only as the years closely approach 1911 do we find him in this group. In the Xingzhonghui days and in his collaboration with secret societies, Sun is sometimes placed in the first group and sometimes in a category resembling the second (Chen Xi-qi, 1957: 19, 24, 34; Wang Ren-chen, 1962: 272; Duan, 1952: 34-35; Yuan, 1955: 21-22). In all their criticisms of anti-Manchuism, Chinese historians are most critical of the first group and least critical of the third.

A more ostensibly Marxist critique leveled at the ideology of anti-Manchuism is that it failed to distinguish between the Manchu nobles and landlords, on the one hand, and the Manchu commoners on the other. RAcialism obscured the possibility of attracting an ally to the cause of a broader revolution. Yet, the fact that even Manchu commoners possessed "special privileges" leads Chen Xu-lu to remark that Zou Rong's "indignation is not without reason" (Chen Xu-lu, 1957: 22-23; see also Liu, 1962: 196). Despite Chen's allowance, such a scholar as Wang Ren-chen adamantly maintains that the grouping of the Manchus as one indivisible unity of "five million" was "a very great shortcoming of [the revolutionaries'] understanding of revolution" and he attributes this failing to racialism (Wang Ren-chen, 1962: 271; Feng, 1965: 30).

Nearly all Chinese historians agree with Lai Xin-xia (1956: 15) that secret societies, such as the Gelaohui and the Hongmen, rendered a great service to the national revolution; however, they also agree that the limitedness of their singular anti-Manchu aim produced a double-edged legacy. While it was indicative of the reaction to oppression—both of the Manchu dynasty and of the landlord system—under which they suffered, it was not explicitly so expressed. As a result, it did not see through to the more fundamental tasks of antiimperialism and antifeudalism. Chinese historians do recognize that the revolutionaries approached the secret societies on the sole basis of anti-Manchuism for the sake of unity and must take most of the blame for shortsightedness. Wang Yi-sun (1962: 131, 140) even argues that the revolutionaries did not dare exceed anti-Manchuism in using the secret societies, for, if the masses arose, the revolutionaries might find themselves in a precarious position. Thus they "shackled" the antifeudal and antiimperialist mass movement with the banner of anti-Manchuism. We see this "lack of thoroughness" argument repeating time and again in the writings of Chinese scholars; it seems to be a baseline of criticism common to all authors (e.g., Li Wen-hai, 1962: 167-168, 170, 174-175, 184; Shao, 1962: 110-111; Lai, 1956: 15; Duan 1952: 34-36).

The antiimperialism theme permeates nearly every article written by modern Chinese scholars. One obvious reason for this

is a desire to be consciously in line with Mao Ze-dong's famous tenet that "the Revolution of 1911 overthrew the mandate of imperialism" although it did not carry this task through to the end. Beyond orthodoxy, the penetrating invective directed at imperialism by Chinese authors appears to be a response to a potential attack on China (e.g., Xu Yin, 1965). Modern Chinese authors are highly critical of the revolutionaries for their inability to mount a thorough attack on imperialism and for their latching onto anti-Manchuism (Li Shi-yue, 1962: 662-667, Liu; 1962: 194; Lai, 1955: 33; Feng, 1965: 22; Li Shi-yue, 1957: 10; Hua, 1949: 201-202; Lu Yan, 1961: 15; Hu Sheng, 1955: 178; Qiu, 1960: 7; Lin Yi, 1965: 87-88; Chen Xu-lu, 1957: 22, 58; and many others).

It would appear that Chinese historians are faced with an impossible contradiction. On one hand, they all reiterate Mao's line that the Revolution of 1911 deposed imperialism. On the other hand, it was not antiimperialist enough and far too anti-Manchu so that imperialism is said to have continued to plague China. The Chinese must have been aware of this apparent contradiction as two of their finer scholars attempted to resolve it implicitly in an essay written on the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution. Hu Sheng-wu and Jin Chong-ji argue that the initial thrust of the "bourgeois revolutionary group" was antiimperialist in nature, but they feared a total partition of China if they were to raise openly antiimperialist slogans and to direct their revolution principally at the foreigners. The constitutionalists took this very position; they believed that revolution and disorder would lead to national dismemberment. Anti-Manchuism was the next best option; if the Qing were to be quickly dethroned and a constitutional republic installed, perhaps the powers would permit or even approve of the momentary chaos and support of the new regime. Hu and Jin scorn the revolutionary leadership's shallow comprehension of imperialism. They could not even see the link tying imperialism and Qing feudal rule. The Manchus, argue Hu and Jin, relied upon imperialism. As the Qing had become the slaves of the foreign powers, anti-Manchuism, for all its racialist and reactionary hues, contained a basic antiimperialist kernel. The revolution did destroy the puppet but not the puppeteer. Only a long, sustained movement which made use of the peasan-

try could fully defeat imperialism (Hu and Jin, 1962a: 652-654). It ought to be stressed that Hu and Jin do not impute such a conscious decision-making process to the revolutionaries; anti-Manchuism's attraction remains due to all the reasons we have enumerated. Its preference to antiimperialism similarly lies in these reasons and particularly the fear of complete racial extinction. Hu and Jin acknowledge all the historical, political, and social causes of anti-Manchuism, but refuse to accept the thesis that the Han-Manchu contradiction ever superseded the contradictions between "imperialism and the Chinese people and between feudalism and the masses."

> For example, if we only advance our investigation from the one point of the Han-Manchu contradiction, then we lack a means to explain why the contradiction which lasted for over two hundred years and, moreover, after the establishment of the Qing dynasty's rule which was in a process of continued weakening, just at that moment [the 1911 period] renewed its ferocity and what is more reached a level of intense sharpness. Obviously the essence of the problem does not lie here. Superficially, the increased ferociousness of the Han-Manchu contradiction, in reality, only reflected a situation of increased ferociousness in the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese people and between feudalism and the masses.
>
> The Revolution of 1911 certainly was not a revolution of Han against Manchu; the Revolution of 1911 certainly was not the product of the Manchu-Han contradiction, but it was the product of the unprecedented depth to which the imperialists' scheme to invade China had progressed. The reason the 1911 Revolution raised "anti-Manchu" slogans was because of the feudal despotic government which was established by the Manchu aristocracy tied to the Han landlord class, had already become the running dog of imperialism. Should they not be overthrown, the Chinese people not only would not be able to eradicate feudal oppression and exploitation, but moreover there was the future danger of extinction by imperialist partition. "Anti-Manchuism" in reality was thus opposition to the rule of imperialism and feudalism. [Hu and Jin, 1962a: 656][10]

CONCLUSION

What then is anti-Manchuism and how does this ideology fit into the Chinese Marxist conception of the intellectual history of the 1911 Revolution? Anti-Manchuism can be distinguished at several levels, all of which assume political importance for modern China. It is the philosophy of Song Jiao-ren, who opposed the Qing rulers because he sought the establishment of a republican government. It is the philosophy of Chen Tian-hua, who despised the Manchus for docilely accepting foreign domination, partition, and imminent extinction. And it is the dripping vituperative (about half of the time) of Zou Rong and Zhang Bing-lin who hated the Manchus for the humiliation and oppression which that inferior race had visited upon the great Han nation. Although we find anti-Manchuism expressed in all of these terms, it is cited by all historians as the main ideology of and as the inspiration for slogans of the 1911 period. Chinese historians do not insist on a class foundation for anti-Manchuism *qua* propagandistic tool. Many do regard the overemphasis of it as the conscious effort of feudal elements to limit the revolution to a political coup d'état, but no historian denies the deeply rooted enmity of the Chinese people for the Manchus, exemplified by the virulence of secret society anti-Manchuism.

To be sure, modern Chinese historians are generally derisive of anti-Manchuism, particularly in its racialist manifestation. It directed the vision of the revolution away from its real enemies, they assert, which were imperialism and feudalism. And yet, we are told that this failure of perception is to be expected of the bourgeois revolution in a colonial or semicolonial setting. Following Lenin, it is argued that in such circumstances only the working class has the ability to perceive the true opponents and to lead a thorough-going revolution. As the revolution had no working class component, it was doomed. They agree that anti-Manchuism was the most unifying theme for the revolutionary camp, and was genuinely felt by all the major participants. However, as a unique goal, it lacked deep revolutionary principles based on fundamental issues (feudalism and imperialism). Modern Chinese scholars laud the downfall of the Qing, but they criticize the paucity of further successes. The 1911 Revolution is

said to have only begun the bourgeois democratic revolution; the May Fourth Movement, eight years later, culminated it. It is the general view of historians from China that because of anti-Manchuism, the Revolution of 1911 was as speedy in gaining its immediate aims as it was meager in its long-range effects.

Thus, Chinese historians have accorded the ideology of anti-Manchuism a central role in the history of the 1911 period despite the numerous difficulties it presents. They have also concentrated on intellectual history and primarily on Zhang Bing-lin. Perhaps Western scholarship should (as the present trends indicate) worry less about whether Sun Yat-sen or Huang Xing was more important to the 1911 Revolution and take a cue from Chinese (and Japanese) historiography as to the issues and personalities of seminal import in this late Qing early Republican period.

NOTES

1. Reproduced in Fan Shu-yi. The Gongjinhui Manifesto had been lost, but through the investigative and oral history projects of numerous Chinese scholars despatched throughout the nation in 1961, it was pieced together from the memories of survivors of the Gongjinhui.

2. This is, of course, not to mention that China has the longest historiographic tradition in the world.

3. Gasster (1969: 221): "He was a Confucian scholar who rejected Confucian morality, a revolutionary who called for the preservation of China's 'national essence,' a nationalist who advocated the abolition of all distinctions among nations and denied that individuals have any obligations to each other, and a leader of the republican movement who condemned representative government."

4. For a superb sampling of Japanese scholarship on Zhang Bing-lin, see Onogawa, Shimada, Takado, Itō, and Kondō.

5. Among the threads of evidence which indicate a heated debate over the thought of Zhang Bing-lin is the suggestion by Zhang Kai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling to table "the argument as to whether or not Zhang Bing-lin was a representative of the anti-Manchu landlord clique" or of some other group. (see Zhang and Liu, 1962: 33; Hubeisheng 1962b: 703-707; SCMP, 2617: 6-7).

6. I use the term "racialist" rather than "racist" because of the connotations of black slavery and of the Warren Commission Report which the latter brings to mind in the American consciousness.

7. Tang (1964: 42) subscribes to this "landlord anti-Manchu clique" analysis as well.

8. Chen Xi-qi was a professor of history at Zhongshan University in Canton. The Canton Military Regional Command announced his arrest as a Goumindang remnant on July 31, 1968 during the Cultural Revolution. (SCMP, 4340: 16; from Zhongda zhanbao, 54, August 4, 1968).

9. In the introduction to the 1960 edition of the works of Qui Jin, we see the same criticism directed at her. The editors commend Qiu's aversion to the religious and superstitious elements of the Boxers, but they label a serious error her failure to applaud their mass antiimperialist stance and their firmness in the face of overwhelming odds. Obsession with the goal of overthrowing the Manchus is regarded as the cause of this "error" (Qui, 1960: introduction).

10. Zhang and Liu (1962: 18-19), present a variant of this view.

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